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Resumé 
La diversité, caractéristique immuable de nos sociétés modernes, implique souvent des 
conflits de valeurs fondamentaux.' Les théories contemporaines de la tolérance, ayant 
comme but de répondre au défis que noUs lancent la diversité culturelle, tentent ?e 
déceler la meille!lre façon d'aborder la différence. Dans la première partie, je procède à 
. une analyse de la problématique des rapports entre le multiculturalisme, la tolérance et le 
féminisme. La seconde partie consiste à évaluer les arguments de plusieurs théories 
contemporaines sur la tolérance telles que celles de Glenn Newey, Ingrid Creppell, Will . 
Kymlicka, Chandran Kukathas, et Jeremy Waldron. En ~onclusion, je propose une 
approche critique face à la culture car elle pe'rmet de remplacer notre méfiance pour une 
ouverture d'esprit face à la justification des pratiques culturelles. 
Mot clés: tolérance, multiculturalisme, culture, droits collectifs, minorités, féminisme. 
Summary 
Toleration impliesdeep disagreement. In fact, toleration often entails disagreement so 
deep that it compels the State to question Whether a practice ought to be put ~p with, 
çlespite its diverge.nce from the moral principles it affirms. The fact that several 
contemporary political theorists view culture as a dominant producer of conflict brings 
them to articulate theories of toleration that address the conflicts of value culture gives 
. . 
rise to. 1 begin by presenting the problematic interplay between multiculturalism, 
feminism, and toleration. ln the second part, 1 evaluate the views of several contemporary 
political theorists and their approaches to .toleration, including those of Ingrid Creppell, 
Glenn Newey, Will Kymlicka, Chandran Kukathas and Jeremy Waldron. 1 conclude in 
support of the view that culture must be approached in a way that allows us to intercept it 
critically, while not deeming the justification of cultural practices as wrought with error 
.prior to examination. 
Keywords: toleratibn, multiculturalism, culture, social conflict, group rights, Iiberalism, 
political theory, women's rights. 
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Introduction 
-----------------------------------
As in the biblical story about the tower of Babel, here we aIl find ourse Ives, 
ancestors of its conclusion: Children of a world in which homogeneity has been 
replaced with confusion, and where the comfort of Baby Ion is far displaced. 
Instead, we aIl find ourselves scattered over diverse landscapes, both moral and 
actual, devoid of clear answers, needing to come to grips with the logical 
consequences that such pluralism entails. Consequently, many wars have been 
waged to attempt to guarantee uniformity. where there was none, and instill 
sameness in the face of diversity. A solution whereby a group must be 
exterminated, or choose annihilation, in order that the powerful obtain peace 
and stability isneither acceptable nor sustainable. The end of the Religio'us 
Wars characterized the failure of such ambition and the triumph of a value 
many herald as libeialism's achievement: Toleration. 
Toleration, as an idea often associated with contemporary liberal 
societies is unquestionably linked to the thriving of pluralism, characteristic of 
many contemporary societies. And yet, many liberal theorists differ in regards 
to its appreciation and application. Sifting through the literature, one grasps the 
lack of consensus around the many derivative questions and conundrums 
toleration occasions. While these questions can remain merely interesting from 
a personal or theoretical standpoint, they are questions, which politics must 
necessarily grapple with. As time pass sorne moral notions shift and acquire 
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status, thereby leaving others beyond the pale. In the shadow which 
disagreement casts, toleration is ofutmost importance: It instates peace between 
individuals that consider each other to be wrong ,about the most fundamental , 
moral questions. 
The initial debates on toleration were provoked bydeep religjous 
disagreement but the correct stance to adop~ in the face of multiculturalism 
dominates the contemporary debate. The shift from religion to cu1t~re in the 
contempora~ literature on toleration occasions an enquiry into pre conceptions 
about culture, since these are unquestionably essential to the development of 
tolerant policies at the present. Different conceptualizations of cultural diversity 
carry theorists to different conclusions concerning tolerance. To name but one 
famous pair, John Locke and John Stuart Mill's views about moral and cultural 
diversity led to rather different formulations of the State's duty. On the one 
hand, Locke's formulation merely argues for restraint or lack of interference in 
matters of religion, while Mill advocates the fostering of diversity 1. This would 
leadboth authors to suggest different measures, which the State,should adopt: 
The absence of coercion in the first case and a positive measure in the second 
(the promotion of diversity). 
In the following pages, l will endeavor to show support for a view in 
competition with the popular opinion that cultures require protection or 
preservation in the form of special rights. It is necessary for a suitable theory of' 
toleration to confront the issue of culture and craft a strategy for dealing with 
Il Jeremy Waldron, "Locke, toleration, and persecution," in'Liberal Rights: Collected 
Papers 1981-1991. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993),88-114. 
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the variety of ways in which 'newness enters the world,2. 1 would like to 
examine the preconceptions about culture that must surround tolerance if it is' 
destined to thrive. In short, 1 would like to elaborate a view of culture, which is 
helpful to a successful institutionalization of toleration. 
Is the so-called death of culture irreversibly tragic, or can we cure the 
wounds that afflict culture in our day, in order to see cultures on the brink of 
extinction coast on into tomorrow unscathed? Will Kymlicka has suggested 
amending liberal political theory to award minority cultures group rights that 
would allow them to compete on equal grounds with majority cultures. Many 
political philosophers have been reluctant to accept Kymlicka's advocacy for 
group rights, but 1 will focus on one respondent in particular - Jeremy Waldron 
- that finds fault in Kymlicka's demand for culturally based group rights. 1 will 
begin by highlighting the conundrum, which arises from the interplay of 
multiculturalism, toleration and a commitment to gender equality. In the second 
half of my analysis, 1 will illustrate a diversity of approaches to toleration as 
defended by Will Kymlicka, Ingrid Creppell, Glenn Newey, and Chandran 
Kukathas,jettisoning them in favor of Waldron's cosmopolitan alternative. 
2 SaI man Rushdie, Imaginary homelands: Essays and criticism 1981 1991 (London: 
Granta Books, 1991), 393. . 
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1 . 
TOLERATION, 
FEMINISM, 
AND GROUP RIGHTS 
INCONFLICT 
. . 
In John Horton's words "rnulticulturalisrn becornes a problern when 
conflicts between groups about values or their interpretation cannot be 
cornfortably accornrnodated within a particular social structure,,3. In rnost cases, 
it is the very social structure,which dictates the kinds of conflicts that bec orne 
problernatic, as weIl as the values that should govern such disputes. The 
particular exarnpIe of the Rushdie Affair4 illustrates both how different cultural 
values can lead to conflict, as weIl as how different conceptions of the State 
3 John Horton, "Liberalism, Multiculturalism, and Toleration" in Liberalism, 
Multiculturalism, and Toleration, ed. John Horton (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1993),3. 
4 For a discussion on the 'Rushdie Affair see Liberalism, Multiculturalism, and 
Toleration, ed. John Horton (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), especially Chapters 
7-11. 
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determine the response to the different levels of disagreement that can be 
permitted. Radically different solutions can result, stemming from the 
interpretation of toleration used, in accordance with the type. of social structure 
at issue. On o~e approach to multiculturalism and toleration, the State should 
refrain from interference into conflicts of value in cultures when its adherents 
have freely chosen their adherence to its values. 
The institutionalization of tolerance led to the uncoupling the State's 
authority over the salvation of men's souls, which led individuals to have 
greater autonomy in charting a morallreligious course. The relationship 
between the State and multiculturalism, rather than the relationship between 
religion and the State now dominates the coiltemporary debate on tolerance . 
. John Horton states, "It might plausibly be thought that toleration should provide 
a particularly promising bridge between liberalism and multiculturalism [sincel 
it is one of liberalism's most important ethical resources for confronting 
multiculturalism"5. Multiculturalism does indeed present a wide array of 
conflicts, between values. Even States, which view multiculturalism as 
desirable, are confronted with the value clashes such as the one between gender 
equality and culture. This means States. must carve out space for each value to 
occupy. As Martha Nussbaum observes, "even if one wére convinced (as 1 
suspect Okin is) that religion is ail superstition, and that a comprehensive 
secular view of the good is correct, we do not show sufficient respect for our 
fellow citizens when we t'ail to acknowledge that they reasonably see the good 
5 John Horton, "Liberalism, Multiculturalism and Toleration," 3. 
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differently,,6. How can we in good faith decide, simply, to override individual 
. choice for the sake of honoring a competing notion, which thinks itself 
superior? 
The introduction to Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? sets the stage 
for a problem now familiar to political theory. Long political struggles have led 
to the consecration of women's rights, and the acknowledgment of the 
"[irrelevance] of skin color to human fate." Sorne political theorists would like 
us to redress another inequality: cultural equality. CulturaJ equality would 
\ 
demand an expansion of liberal rights in order to allow minority groups to . 
attenuate the larger society's economic and political power, which would "help 
to promote justice between ethnocultural groups, by ensuring that members of 
the minority have the same effective capacity to promote their interests as the 
majority."7 Susan Moller Okin criticizes this movement on the basis that these 
ethnocultural rights could lead to serious lapses in the recognition of gender 
equality. The cultural egalitarianism, which Kymlicka yearns for is at odds with 
equal consideration for men and women within these cultures. From this angle, 
the demand for tolerance of minority cultures ·would be compromised on the 
basis that minority cultures "treat female members as subordinate no-counts"s. 
6 Martha ç. Nussbaum, "A Plea for Difficulty," in Is Multiculturalism Bad for 
Women7, eds. Joshua Cohen and Martha C. Nussbaum (Princeton: Princeton· 
University Press, 1999), 108. 
7 Will Kymlicka, "Liberal Complacencies" in Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? 
eds. Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard, and Martha C. Nussbaum (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1999),32. . 
.. 8 Joshua Cohen et al. introduction to Is MulticulturalismBad for Women? eds. Joshua 
Cohen, Matthew Howard, and Martha C. Nussbaum (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1999),4. 
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Susan Moller Okin implores us to prioritize the women of these cultures, 
instead of siding with the patriarchal cultures that burden women with unfair 
treatment on the basis of their gender. Instead of granting group' rights to 
cultures that enshrine principles incompatible with liber<:tl rights, we should 
revert to the assimilationist expectation that minority groups bring their 
practices into accordance with the majority culture9 • Her argument presents a 
rather grim picture of minority groups that have sought exemption from the law 
on the basis that their cultures vindicate the poor treatmeilt of women. She is 
skeptical even of the groups which are internally liberal since "most cultures are 
suffused with practices and ideologies concerning gender.,,10 Most groups 
undermine a commitment to feminist values by means of practices and ways of 
life that embody the desire to "li mit the capacities of women and girls ... to live 
as freely chosen lives as they can.")) To p~y no heed to this fact is to dispense 
with any commitment to the pith and substance of feminism. Okin cites many 
examples of cultural groups that have invoked their culture in order to be 
exonerated of crimes against women. She, in the process, provocatively asks us 
to recognize the fact that "most cultures have as. one of their principal aims the 
control of women by men"l2. These cultures comprise most of the religions of 
the world (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) as weIl as the founding myths of 
the ancient Western civilizations of Greece and Rome. If liberal societies are to 
9 Susan Moller Okin, "Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?" in Is'Multiculturalism 
Bad for Women? eds. Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard, and Martha'C. Nussbaum. 
(Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1999) 9. 
10 Susan Moller Okin, "Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?" 12. 
Il Susan Moller Okin, "ls Multiculturalism Bad for Women?" 13. 
12 Susan Moller Okin, "Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?" 13. 
\ 
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have zero tolerance for cultures that are consistent with antifeminism, they must 
affront a veritable slew of opponents. 
Kymlicka wants to give cultural minorities special rights "because their 
cultures may otherwise be threatened with extinction [which would] undermine 
the self-respect and freedom of group members,,13, in so far as these minority 
cultures go vern themselves according to liberal principles and refrain from 
discriminating against or violating the basic liberties of their members l4 • Okin 
opines that Kymlicka's liberal demands will not be met by "far fewer minority 
cultures than Kymlicka seems to think will be able to claim group rightsunder 
his Iiberal justification.,,15 Moreover, because Kymlicka fails to realize sex 
discrimination is less overtand far more informai and private than the forms of 
sex discrimination he deems sufficient to without special group rights, "it is by 
no means c1ear, fiom a feminist p,oint bf view, that minority group rights are 
"part of the solution.""16 On this basis, Okin concludes the following: 
ln the case of a more patriarchal minority culture in the context of a less 
patriarchal majority culture, no argument can be made. on the basis of 
self-respect or freedom that the female members of the culture have a 
. clear interest in its preservation. Indeed, they might be much better off if 
the culture into which they were born were either to become extinct (so 
that its members would become integrated into the less sexist surrounding 
culture) or, preferably, to be encouraged to alter itself. so as to reinforce 
13 Susan Moller Okin, "Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? ," 20. 
14 Susan Moller Okin, "Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? ," 20. 
15 Susan Moller Okin, "Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?," 2l. 
16 Susan Moller Okin, "Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?," 22. 
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the equality of women - at least to thedegree to whichthis value is 
upheld in the majority culture. 17 
Thus, we should be weary of granting groups rights since minorities within 
these groups "may be harmed rather than promoted by the granting of such 
rights. ",18 
Kymlicka, in his response to Okin, pledges support to Okin's strict 
demands, despite her dire view of culture. Kymlicka believes he and Okin are 
unified in their quest for the expansion of liberalism for the sake of cultural 
minorities or women's rights. He cites his distinction between 'internaI 
restrictions" and "external protections" to show his sensitivity to Okin's 
demands. 
On his' view, "internaI restrictions',' (restrictions which prevent 
individuals from questioning, revising, or abandoning cultural precepts), are 
always unacceptable because they "violatethe autonomy of individuals and 
create injustice within the groyp,,19. The group rights he vindicates caU for 
"external protections" that aim "to prornote justice between ethnocultural 
groups" by remedying conditions external to the group that lead to and ingrains 
the inequality between minority cultures and other groups, notably majority 
groupS20. Kymlicka contends his theory is compatible with the opposition of 
cultural norms that oppress ·women domestically rather than "in a purely formaI 
17 Susan Müller Okin, "Is Multiculturalism Bad for Wümen?," 22-23. 
18 Susan Müller Okin, "Is Multiculturalism Bad for Wümen?," 24. 
19 Will Kymlicka, "Liberal Cümplacencies," 31. 
20 Will Kymlicka, "Liberal Cümplacencies,"32. 
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or legalistic way,,21. He also sees Okin's opposition to his theory as regrettable, 
since he identifies with Okin's cause. The purpose and intent of awarding 
cultural minorities group rights and of protecting the interests of feminism are 
one and the same: They both aim to advance the interests of particular groups in 
order to correct an oversight in liberal theory, which has meant "that libe'ralism 
has been blind to grave injustices which limit the freedom and harm the self-
respect of woinen and ethnocultural minorities.,,22 Kymlicka and Okin seek to 
part with liberalism in so far, and as soon as, liberalism fails to accord with the 
particular group interests they wish to defend. Of course liberalism should be 
capable of addressing their critiques and have compelling reasons for not 
accommodating their desires. But l think both Kymlièka and Okin are wrong to 
level accusations on the State on the basis that it does not fully agree with their 
view. 
The reason we should hesitate to confirm Okin's prescription is that 
there is a thriving debate' which operates from within cultures concerning the 
value of gender equality. To stifle, or dictate the outcome of, a conflict over the 
proper way to enshrine principles within a culture, is in conflict with a further 
fundamental principle of liberal societies: toleration. Toleration would have the 
State show restraint despite fundamental disagreement over what is right and 
what is wrong. No argument for toleration is absolute or without its limits, but 
it is rare that an account of toleration would alienate more than half the world's 
cultures and religions on the basis of a conflict of _values which is unsettled 
21 Will Kymlicka, "Liberal Complacencies," 32. 
22 Will Kymlicka, "Liberal Complacencies," 33. 
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even amongst feminists. Okin's argument is interesting however, since she 
argues in favor of promoting the norm of gender equality which allliberal states 
endorse. This raises an interesting question: Can the commitment to a basic 
right be violated for the sake of honoring a commitment to tolerance, or should 
tolerance be compromised in order to promote a right whose value is desecrated 
by the majority of religions and cultures? 
Okin's conception orders the good from the top down. Accordingly, ail 
values should conform to the advancement of gender equality. Okin's 
indictment of religion before it has had a chance to present its arguments, stems 
from this fact. 1 prefer the alternative by which we start from the assumption 
that ail views are prima facie equal (or innoce~t until proven guilty). The 
alternative 1 am proposing is the one which Martha Nussbaum associates with 
the political liberal that "commits herse If to a politicaJ course that is as 
protective of [reasonable comprehensive doctrines] as it is possible to be,,23.· 
Like Nussbaum, 1 think it noxious to political life to prevent individuals from 
designing their life plans. It may be asked whether the restriction of religious 
liberty or what the State deems 'sexist' religious practices is more burdensome. 
That is, are women more burdened in eithet case by the State or their religious 
community? 1 would conclude, as does Nussbaum that "it seems illiberaJ to 
hold that practices internaI to the conduct of the religious body itself ... must 
always be brought into line with a secular liberal understanding of the uItimate 
23 Martha C. Nussbaum, "APlea for Difficulty" in ls Multiculturalism Bad for 
Women? eds. Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard, and Martha C. Nussbaum (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1999), 109. 
\. 
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goOd.,,24 Bringing religious practices into tine with what the State deems 
acceptable transgresses what poli tics has become since the institutionalization 
of toleration. No matter their intention, such intrusions prave, in retrospect, to 
, 
'be appalling abuses of power. 
The opposite is true of course: not everything is permitted and the State 
is usually warranted in slicing on one side or the other when such conflicts 
materialize. In the words of Joseph Raz: "we should not assume the right to 
reject or condemn wholesale the cultures of groups within ours Iwhen we find 
them replete with oppression]"25. Our desire to put end to cultural groups often 
rests on the fact that we are outsiders to its ways26. Raz recognizes that this 
simple element of the power dynamic between liberalisrn and culture cannot be 
overlooked. But if we cannot unjustifiably preserve cultural minorities, we also 
cannot unjustifiably preserve the integrity of the majority culture. In both cases, 
\ . 
cultural extinction is just not a viable project and such desires are often due to 
the fact that members of a cultural group cannot wish for its extinction: a wish 
only outsiders could aspire tü27. As Joseph Raz concludes, "the need for 
sensible multicultural measures arises out of dilemmas generated by imperfect 
reality. They represent the least worst policy, not a triumphal new discovery,,28. 
It would not be desirable to shun the asymmetrical relationship between civil 
24 Martha C. Nussbaum, "A Plea for Difficulty," 114. 
25 Joseph Raz, "How Perfect Should One 8e?" in Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? 
. eds. Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard and Martha C. Nussbaum (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1999),97. , 
26 Joseph Raz, "How Perfect Should One Be?," 97. 
27 Joseph Raz, "How Perfect Should One Be? ," 98. 
28 Joseph Raz, "How Perfect Should One Be?", 98. 
" ( 
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laws and religious laws in favor of symmetry bètween both types of norms, as 
Cass Sunstein has suggested,since such asymmetry merely reflects 'the fact that 
we allow those that disagree with the majority's to exist in spite of their 
The asymmetry between civil and religiouslaw is present precisely 
because we t01erate difference in liberal democracies, and the discomfort which 
results stems from the fact that the majority can desire the extinct,ion of 
, minority cultures in ways it cannot wish for the extinction of its own culture's 
values. Susan Moller Okin views this as the regrettable consequence of policies 
that desire to respect cultures on their own terms rather than to have them 
assimilate. The assimilationist expectation is not only oppressive but also at 
odds with toleration. Placed wi.thin a newcontext, cultural groups may learn to 
regard themselves from a different perspective and cast their views in a new 
mould, but we should not force this evolution. In the tribunal of political an~ 
moral reasoning, guilt and innocence are delicate and volatile verdicts. We 
should be careful to dispense judgment of cultural practices prior to any 
consideration or consultation of thosethat stand to lose. Prejudices persist wh~n 
assesSment is absent. 
Jeremy Waldron presents the example of Romeo and Juliet to show that 
viewing novelty as alien often leads individuals to flee outside the society that 
29 Cass R. Sunstein, "Should Sex Equ~lity Law Apply to Religious Institutions?" in Is 
Multiculturalism Bad for Women? eds. Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard, and Martha 
C. Nussbaum (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999) 85-94. 
\ . 
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refuses to recognize them30 (or prefer death by poisoning to exclusion and 
exile). Those that are forced to eschew the masses in order to live freely will 
have to do so under tragic conditions. We should, first, attempt toleration in 
order to avoid the desperation which minority cultures are bound to feel when 
forced to choose betwéen what is near and dear to them and what ispopularly 
desirable. Under duress, the Yiddish proverb "a choice is not a choice", 
certainly holds true. 
In the case of Susan Moller Okin, 1 have attempted to show how her 
view harbors sentiments ultimately at odds with toleration - the very value, 
. which makes pluralism viable. Wendy Brown's view of toleration as a 
civilizing dis course provides another interesting vantage point from which to 
criticize theorists that Okin exemplifies. According to Wendy Brown, it is 
dangerous to assume that "liberalism is the antidote to culture,,3l, since doing so 
leads us to obscure the fact that the "reduction of the political to policy and law, 
sets loose ... a sea of social powers nearly as coercive as law, and certainly as 
effective in producing subordinated subjects,,32.' Further, Brown observes: 
The putative legal autonomy of· the subject, along with. the putative 
autonomy of the law itself from gendered norms and from culture more 
generally, combine to position women in the West as free, choosing 
30 As Glenn Newey has proposed, in an argument we willlater tum to, 'muralism' in 
such cases may be the only way to provide individuals with thesecurity to live as they 
please. 
31 Wendy Brown, "Tolerance as/in Civilizational Discourse" in Toleration and its 
Limits: NOMOS XLVIII, eds. Melissa S. Williams and Jeremy Waldron (New York: 
New York University Press, 2008) 427. 
32 Wendy Brown, "Tolerance as/in Civilizational Discourse," 427. 
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beings who stand in stark contrast to their sisters subjected to legally 
sanctioned cultural barbarism?3 
A lexical ordering of values, albeit a cautious and critical one, can lead to 
radical conclusions when liberal principles are assumed to trump aU other$. The 
assumption that liberal neutrality is superior at adjudicating conflict, due to its 
auto nom y from any contentious norms, would have the unfortunate 
consequence of eclipsing the legitimacy of any context of choice that lies 
beyond the pale of liberal neutrality. The tendel1cy that liberal neutralists have 
. of denying toleration to any form of life which does not rest on the autonomy of 
the subject is but a self-affirmation, which does not get to the heart of the 
problem. To quote Brown: 
The liberal construction of tolerance as respect for individual autonomy 
secured by a secular state, a construction shared by liberal theorists on 
both sides of the "group rights" debates, means that the practice of 
tolerance is inconceivable where such autonomy is not a core. political 
principle and juridical norm. Such an account of tolerance not only 
consecrates liberalism's superiorify but aiso reiterates liberalism's 
obliviousness to social powers other than law and thereby sustains the 
conceit of the thoroughgoing autonomy of the liberal subject. 34 
If Wendy Brown is correct, then çontroversial cultural practices at odds with 
the value of autonomy do not occasion tolerance, but intolerance. So what does 
the liberal State accomplish by coupling toleration with a higher order moral 
33 Wendy Brown, "Tolerance as/in Civilizational Discou~se," 427. 
34 Wendy Brown, "Tolerance as/in Civilizational Discourse," 428. 
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principle, which most controversial practices contravene? If gender equality is -
sufficient grounds for trumping the value of tolerance only b~cause it is more 
compatible with the value of autonomy than multiculturalism, then Okin's 
argument seems rather weak. So how must we mediate such inter-right conflicts 
defined as "conflicts between particular instances of different rights,,35? 
. Jeremy Waldron suggests two alternatives to approaching inter-right 
conflicts: a lexical ordering, and a quantitative weighing of rights. According 
to Waldron,· "the ide a that all rights· should be put on a par seems 
implausible.,,36 Hard cases like the one l have been discussing lead us to 
consider the truth of this proposition, and wonder what method in fact there 
\ 
could be for circumnavigating a conflict of the kind. In Rights in Conflict, 
Jeremy Waldron discusses the possibility of a lexical ordering,ofrights. Lexical 
ordering is the idea that "different rights have the same sort of priority over one 
another that rights generally are sometimes given overconsiderations of 
mundane utility,,37. Duties associated with a right of fundamental. importance 
cannot be assumed to be "more important than any duty associated with any of 
the others,,38. Likewise, it is rather difficult to "think of rights as weighted 
quantitatively. in/relation to one another (so that we allow a right to life to be 
35 Jeremy Waldron, "Rights in Conflict," in Liberal Rights: 'Collected Papers 1981-
1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) 217. 
36 Jeremy Waldron, "Rights in Conflict," 219. 
37 Jeremy Waldron, "Rights in Conflict," 218. 
38 Jeremy Waldron, "Rights in Conflict," 219. 
worth rive rights to free speech, or whatever).,,39 He draws upon John Stuart 
Mill's argument for freedom of expression in order to arrive at a solution. 
This right to freedom of expression is widely believed' to clash with the 
interest people have in avoiding the distress that arises when their 
cheri shed beliefs are contradicted. But within Mill's framewotk, that 
'--..--
conflict is easily resolved. Since the whole point of free expression is to 
challenge received opinion and shake up complacency, the discomfiture 
attendant on that challenge is tobe given no weight at .all against free 
speech; rather it is to be regarded as a good sign that free speech is 
fulfilling its function. Once again, our conception of the interest' s 
importance already tells us a lot about the sort of consideration to which 
it is appropriately opposed4Û• 
Despite the fact a right is found to have more weight than another, the right 'of 
lesser importance' "does not disappear from view once it has been traded off 
against the rights of others" 41. The right to gender equality, for example, in a 
hard case like this would not disappear from sight but continue to be taken 
seriously.Nevertheless, this does not mean another right, (such as the right to 
freedom of religion, of conscience or of ~ssociation) could not privileged. 
Rights do not simply disappear from view when we prioritize another right due 
to the duties that are associated with them, so choosing to privilege minority 
cultures' rights rather than jettisoning,them as a set in favor of gender equality 
39 Jeremy Waldron, "Rights in Conflict, " 219. 
40 Jeremy Waldron, "Rights in Conflict," 221. 
41 Jeremy Waldron, "Rights in ~onflict," 215. 
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does not mean gender equality fades from sight, or lessens in importance. It is a 
ha~d choice, which follows from conflict. When rights clash, we must outline 
the internai reasons that underlie the priority of a right's duties. So, if tolerarice 
implies giving respect to what is unpleasant to us, a right of this kind will 
always be respected begrudgingly and imply sorne sort of discomfort at the 
thought that it clashes with a value of fundamental importance to our society. If 
discomfort accompanies the right to practice one's religion freely and this 
/ discomfort is not occasioned by serious harm (for example, to a person's 
physical integdty), then we must recognize that this quality an internai 
characteristic, proper to the respect of toleranc-e in a society faced with 
di versity. Gender equality will sometimes be compromised by the respect of 
tolerating what we find intuitively abhorrent, but the necessary internaI relation 
between both moral considerations will lead us to notice that individuals ought 
to be allowed to choose the moral framework within which they live their lives 
and by .which they order their choices. Choosing to s~un individuals on the 
basis that the moral creed they vow to makes us feel uncomfortable is exactly 
what tolerance demands of us, and gender rights ought not be sufficient grounds 
to bring traditional practices into a more symmetrical relationship with the 
practices we deem valuable. In most cases, it will even seem vain to 'make such 
demands. This, to recall Wendy Brown's argument, does not mean we should 
close ourselves off from minority cultures in su ch a way as to make them Other. 
We should also be careful to view, as Glen Newey does, the building walls and 
the imposition of cloistered lives on indi viduals so that the potential threat of 
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their values may be circumvented as a consequence of tolerance. Nevertheless, 
tolerance ought only apply to and protect practices that its adherents obtain 
sorne value from,and not practices which only bring sorne community members 
fulfillment (or that allow the strongest member~ of a group to patently oppress 
its weakest fellows). 
Susan Moller Okin's has exemplified weariness of multiculturalism on 
the basis that she associates culture with misogynistic values but it is unclear 
whether women who se ties to liberal culture are stronger than to any specifie 
. minority culture are necessarily better off. Okin's vision is rather myopie and at 
its worst, her dialogue is largely ostracizing. Many have counterbalanced her 
view, alleging religious practices are no more counterparts to sexist values, than 
miniskirts are to sexist values. Okin's conclusion simply ignores the dangerous 
power dynamic, which a normative solution Iike her own could foster. The 
widespread mischaracterization of poorly understood practices, as Wendy 
Brown poignantly argues42, often causes individuals to flee from widespread 
contempt and scorn to the exc1usivity and safety of culture, or to prefer what 
Glen Newey has termed 'muralism,43 in order to obtain the basé amount of 
security needed in order to arrange their lives according to their own priorities~ 
on their own terms. 
42 Wendy Brown, Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
r 43 Glen Newey, "Toleration, Poli tics , and the Role of MuraIity ," in Toleration and its 
Limits: NOMOS XLVIII, eds. Meslissa S. Williams and Jeremy Waldron (New York: 
New York University Press. 2008),375. 
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Toleration isn't ~esirable because it is ideal, but because it is hecessary. 
It is the only way to continue on with our compatriots when we disagree. 
Agreeing to disagree can turn begrudged cooperation into willing cohabitation. 
Above aU, it allows each and every to live their lives free of worry that their 
unpopular way of life will be sanctioned by the State. It is of course true that 
toleration will encounter its boundaries from time to time. 
In a more nuanced follow-up to "Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?", 
Okin is careful to state that she was not pleading for the extinction of culture at 
aIl costs, for the sake of greater gender equality. She daims she was merely 
trying to diffuse the tension between multiculturalism and feminism by 
proposing a solution that wo'uld "minimize the likelihood that societies would 
be faced with a stark choice between the twO.,,44 In this attenuated·response, she 
suggests, "discussion about group rights should be premised on a good-faith 
effort to ensure that liberal-multicultural aims do not contribute to unequal 
intra-group social power that is perpetuated by democratic means.,,45 And yet, 
in her conclusion, Okin'sold language returns when she asks "Is it worse to 
force [traditional nomoi groupsl to be democratic or to be liberal as a cost of 
acquiring special rights or privileges?"46 Again she wonde~s which type of force 
is required, riever hesitating about its use in the first place. 
44 Susan Moller Okin, "Multiculturalism and feminism: no simple question, no simple 
answers," in Minorities Within Minorities: Equality,Rights and Diversity, eds. Avigail 
Eisenberg and Jeff Spinner-Halev (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2005), 71. 
45 Susan Moller Okin, "Multiculturalism and feminism: no simple question, no simple 
answer," 75. . 
46 Susan Moller Okin, "Multiculturalism and feminism: no simple question, no simple 
answer," 87. 
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It is important to be aware of the dangers of attempting to determine or 
replace ·what people cherish in their lives. Okin, in seeing a problem with 
cultures thatclash with. gender equality, neglects to attribute any value to the 
women ~hat see worth in the cultures they belong to. Okin, wrongfully, regards 
the women in these groups as subjécts of injustice a priori based on rather 
infrequent and atypical cases of culturally sanctioned injustices towards 
women. Okin is more than right to suggest that individuals that commit wrongs 
against their equals, without proper justification or) defense, should be brought 
to justice, but not for any reason having to do with culture. Justice simply 
demands that every violent or abusive offense should be puni shed on the basis 
that we are aIl, as indi.viduals, equal before and under the lawand liable for 
actions that transgress the most basic principles it enshrines. Neither tolerance 
of the se offenses, nor consideration for its perpetrators is appropriate.lil fact, in 
such instances, the sheer thought that tolerance or clemency might be needed or 
deserved could only be attributed to one thought too many. 
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2. 
SIX 
PERSPECTIVES 
ON TOLERATION 
a. Will Kymlicka's theory of group rights 
Conceptually, toleration aims not to be sectarian, but minority cultures 
are often made to paya co st for their beliefs or practices that is not levied on 
the majority culture47 • Will Kymlicka has made a career out of teasing out the 
implications of this view. The solution he proposes is to remedy cultural 
imbalance by awarding groups special rights. Since culture provides the context 
of choice, within which individuals form their life plans, any liberal, that daims 
to endorse free choice, yet provides no protections to minority cultures, asks . 
individuals to make bereft choices. Kymlicka concludes: 
Liberais should be concerned with the fate of cultural structures, not 
47 For example, at one time, the 1906 Lord's Day Act required that businesses be 
c10sed on Sunday, thereby penalizing those that did not honor Sunday as their day of 
rest. Although the Lord's Day Act was eventually deemed unconstitutional by the 
Supreme Court of Canada because it was religiously motivated, the Ontario's Retail 
Business Holiday Act, another law that disadvantaged religious minorities, was not 
deemed unconstitutional because its purpose was secular. 
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. bec au se they have sorne moral status of their own, but because it's only 
through having a rich and sec ure cultural· structure that people can 
becomes aware, in a vivid way, of the options available to them, and 
intelligently examine their value.48 
If politics di~ not privilege the protection of culture, cultural minorities 
would be forced to chdose within a deficient context of choice49 . Without 
cultural membership, individuals can neither properly nor fully exercise their 
autonomy. Will Kymlicka criticizes a rampant tendency to equate liberalism 
with a social ontology revolving around an atomistic conception of the self. 
Kymlicka views this atomism as incompatible with the central importance of 
cultural communityand thinks liberalism need not imply it. Kymlicka also 
embeds an egalitarian claim within his argument: National minorities should 
, 
have the same right to nation building as the national majority50. Fair terms of 
integration are necessary in order that a higher cost is not imposed on minority 
groups than on members of the majority. As Kymlicka rightly points out, there 
are two aspects of community: "the political community, within which 
48 Kymlicka, Li berali sm , Community and Culture (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989), 
165. . 
49 This answer is similar to Bernard Williams's critique of John Rawls. In the said 
critique, Williams accuses Rawls of the tendency to abstract too broadly from 
individmils' life plans and to prioritize rationality over integrity. He concludes that this 
forecloses the very beliefs that bring individuals to care about more abstract rational 
principles in the first place. Similarly, Kymlicka accuses John Rawls of not including 
cultural membership as one of the primary goods with which justice is concerned 
which he should have because consideration of cultural membership is an important 
part of showing equal concem for individuals. This is why we must recognize cultural 
membership as a context of ch9ice. 
50 Will Kymlicka, "Multiculturalism," in Contemporàry Political Philosophy (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), 352. 
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individuals exercise the rightsand responsibilities entailed by the framework of 
liberal justice" and" the cultural community, within which individuals form 
and revise their aims and ambitions.,,51 Kymlicka believes that the approach, 
which the state adopts towards cultural diversity, is determined by "the role 
cultural membership plays in liberal theory. 52 Curing liberalism of the typical 
liberal beliefthat there is an inherent conflict between individual and collective 
rights53 allows us to conclude both categories of rights are coextensive rather 
than exclusive. Finally,. Kymlicka differentiates between two meanings of 
collective rights. Collective rights could designate "the right of a group to limit 
the liberty of its own individual members in the name of gr<:>up solidarity or 
cultural purity ('internaI restrictions') or "theright of a group to limit the 
econoniic or political power exercised by the larger society over the group, to 
ensure that the resources and institutions on which the minority depends are not 
vulnerable to majority decisions ('external protections,).,,54 His account seeks 
external protections for minority groups rather than internaI restrictions. 
Kymlicka's theory of group rights hinges on the typical- liberal concern for 
autonomy. For this reason, minority rights cannot be said to vindicate 'internaI 
restrictions' which limit the minority· culture's own members. 'InternaI 
restrictions' are incompatible with allowing people to draft and revise the 
principles that order their lives, as weIl as their community's. Groups that 
51 Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, 135. 
52 Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, 135; . 
53 See also John Tomasi "Kymlicka, Liberalism, and Respect for Cultural Minorities" 
Ethics, Vol. 105, No. 3 (Apr., 1995): 580-603. 
YI Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community a~d Culture, 7. 
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attempt to limit the freedom and autonomy of its members in order to preserve 
a traditional way of life "cannot be justified or defended within a liberal 
conception of minorityrights.,,55 The only groups that qualify for gro~p rights 
are groups whose principles are compatible with liberal principles. Whenever 
the said communities are at odds with the principle of autonomy, it would be 
legitimate for the State to liberalize them or enter into negotiations about. 
changes that could be made. The tolerance of minority cultures ends where their 
lack of concem for the freedom and autonomy of their members begins. 
DifferentiaI treatment, on Kymlicka's view, yields greater equality than 
blind indifference to c~lture since, left al 0 ne, minority cultures would be 
vulnerable to -the majority culture's noxious influence that endangers the life 
and prosperity of minority cultural communities. Based on all the premises 
heretofore elaborated, Kymlicka concludes that the respect for persons qua 
members of cultures, as opposed.to pers ons qua persons, is not illiberal since 
individuals are not subsumed to the will of the community. Caring for cultural 
communities means caring for the individuals that belong to and cherish them. 
Kymlicka often references aboriginal c0!llmunities, which in sorne places have 
a system of reservations that "form special political jurisdictions over which 
Indian communities have certain guaranteed powers, and within which non-
Indian Americans have restricted mobility, property, and voting rights"S6. 
Aboriginal rights revolve around the respect for conventions, which date back 
55 Kymlicka, "Toleration and its Limits," in Multicultural citizenship: a liberal theory 
ofminority rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 153. 
56 Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, 136. 
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to the early conquest of the Americas. The pacts, which were formed, are not as 
empty and inconsequential as a simple promise: they are pacts, which were-
formed based on more substantive and durable expectations. That is, to say, the 
community leaders that negotiated with the early settlers expected that their 
agreements would hold validity enduringly. Tt is widely recognized that respect 
of such contracts has been sidestepped to the benefit of the early settlers and 
their descendents, at the expense of the aboriginal communities with which they 
were formed. Thus, it is to be expected that aboriginal communities continue to 
seek justice if the promises made were broken or voided. The claim of Native 
Americans relies on a status, which was 'created' to prote ct their interests.The 
subsequent large-scale manipulation of Native Americans is what present day 
legal provisions seek to curtail and correct. The sections in the Canadian 
Constitution that grant Aboriginals a special status under the law are such an 
attempt. In short, the recognition of aboriginal rights is premised on a 
contractual and moral obligation. 1 diverge from Kymlicka's belief, however, 
that the culturalorigin of these rights is what gives them special priority. It is 
also hard to see how this example extends to cultural communities whose 
membership to society does not depend on an initial agreement that revolves 
around a promise of autonomy and self-determination. 
In "Two Models of Pluralism and Tolerance" and in the chapter of 
Multicultural Citizenship on "Toleration and its Limits", Kymlicka cites the 
millet system in order to illustrate the fact that toleration can stem from a 
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political system that enshrines grouprights, rather than one whose focus is on 
individual rights, as in the case of liberalism. Under the Ottoman Empire, the 
millet system gave cultural minorities "not only the freedom to practice their 
religion, but a more general freedom to govern themselves in purely internaI 
matter, with their own legal codes and courtS."S7 The arrangement permitted 
groups to coexist and to auto-govern. their 'private' relations, while 
simultaneously being subject to the rules governing 'public' interactions. The 
cultural autonomy granted to minorities under the millet system came at a cost 
however, since cultural minorities did not receive equal treatment andwere 
required to identify their separateness by means of a distinctive dress code58 • 
Moreover, while allowing diverse cultural communities to live side-by-side in a 
relatively stable and peaceful way, the millet system offered no individual 
protections for the members of minority cultures, nor were these communities 
permitted to express their dissatisfaction with the theocratic nature of the 
society at large. The millet system's institutionalization of group rights differs 
greatly from Kymlicka's approach in another important way: the millet system 
encroaches upon individual autonomy. Kymlicka states the millet system 
"limits individual's ability and freedom to judge the value of inherited practices 
and to hereby form and revise their own conception of the goOd."S9 The millet' 
system also "harms a basic interest of people, by leaving them unable to 
rationally assess the worthiness of their current ends and to revise their ends 
5TWill Kymlicka, "Two Models of PÎuralism and Tolerance," in Toleration: an elusive 
virtue, ed. David Heyd (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996),83. 
58 Will Kymlicka, "Two Models of Pluralism and Tolerance," 83. 
59 Will Kymlicka, "Two Models of Pluralism and Tolerance," 87. 
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accordingly."OO The typical liberal concern for. autonomy must incl ude the 
abiHty to revise as well as pursue a conception of the good, on Kymlicka' s 
view61 . Deprived of this ability, individuals would be forced to orient their lives 
according to a moral conception once and for ail. As my mother used to say: "il 
y a seulement lesfous qui ne changent pas d'avis". It is only right, then, that a 
. . 
society be willing to accommodate the right to revise the Iife plans of our past. 
Kymlicka suggests we alter this aspect of the millet system, which he deems 
overly restrictive of individual liberty while retaining its focus on minority 
rights. Bringing toleration into accord with autonomy is necessary since, 
according to Kymlicka, "Iiberals have historically seen autonomy and tolerance 
as two si des of the same coin."62 Liberal tolerance is characterized by a 
commitment to autonomy63, so we must bring liberalism into accord with 
autonomy in order to respect "the idea that individuals should be free to assess 
and potentially revise their existing ends,,,64 
As John Tomasi rightly remarks, what is odd about Kymlicka',s 
argument is tha~ he uses an individualistic justification "as a basis for a defense 
of the collective notion of a cultural right,,65. The 'origin of this problem, 
according to Tomasi, is that the original identification of culture with a context 
60 Will Kymlicka, "Two Models of Pluralism and Tolerance," 88. 
61 .Will Kymlicka, "Two Models of Pluralism and Tolerance," 88. 
62 Will Kymlicka, "Toleration and its Limits," in Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1995),158. 
63 Will Kymlicka, "Toleration and its Limits," 158. 
64 Will Kymlicka, ''Toleration and its Limits," 158. 
65 John Tomasi, "Kymlicka, Li beralism , and Respect for Cultural Minorities," Ethics, 
Vol. 105, No. 3 (Apr., 1995): 586-7. 
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of choice, is later transformed so that culture is equated with a stable context of 
choice.66 Whenever the stability of the culture is at risk, then, the State must 
intervene in order to restore the cultural community's strength. Kymlicka 
presents the example of an Inuit girl who se exposure to white society from the 
ages of two to eighteen leads t6 a loss of culture and the correlative 
destabilization of her context of choice, so as to alter her very ability to choose. 
Tomasi objects that the conclusion which Kymlicka draws (that the Inuit girl's 
exposure to two cultures, rather than a single stable culture, leads to the demi se 
of her context of choice) is flawed since the simple fact that the girl was 
exposed two cultures - one stable and one less stable --,.- does not me an she did 
not choose within a cultural context but simply that her choices were spawned 
bya more complex cultural context. When examined from the perspective of 
the unstable culture, if instability can be seen as damaging to individuals, State 
action will be required to restore vitality to the cultural community. But if we 
regard the situation from a diachronie perspective, as John Tomasi believes the 
individualistic perspective urges us to do, we are forced to consider the threat to 
autonomy as far less serious. Recognizing that an individuals' context of choice 
issues from more than one cultural source need not be scorned unless the value 
of cultural integrity is lauded. Complex contexts of choice do not necessarily 
result from coercion so much as from progression or from autonomous choices. 
Moreover, as Chandran Kukathas observes, "groups are not made up of·· 
equal persons and not aU members of a group are unequal (in the relevant 
66 John Tomasi, "Kymlicka, Liberalism, and Respect for Cultural Minorities," 587. 
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respects) to aU those outside it.,,67 Kymlicka would need to supplement his 
account with changes that are threatening to the character of a community and 
those which are not threatening. The mutability of cultures refers to the fact that 
culture waxes and wanes over time in consequence of many factors. Sometimes 
the change stems from the autonomy of its members, sometimes the change 
results from new inter-group encounters. Moreover, groups are not always 
homogeneous68, thereby making their interests hard to identify. Group interests 
are often merely reflected by the opinion of the majority within a group. From a 
liberal point of view, recognizing group rights could lead tO' a lack of 
consideration for the dissenters within a community. The mutability of culture 
should lead us to be skeptical about cultural rights since they do not 
acknowledge every interest of every member of minority groups. Abstracting 
from the i~dividuals of groups ignores the complexity of a group's rnakeup. To 
award rights to th~ wider group has the effect of favoring the majority of the 
group and not every one of its members. 
Kymlieka wonders if liberalism's "commitment to autonomy Îs an 
acceptable basis for governrnent in a modern pluralistic society, giventhat 
sorne groups do not value autonomy.,,69 Kymlicka believes we should affirm a . 
view of toleration that alienates groups that cannot subject their beliefs to 
revision, (as the early John Rawls did). Against Rawls, Kymlicka states: 
67 Chandran Kukathas, "Cultural Rights Again: A RejO'inder to Kymlicka" Political 
TheO'ry, VO'l. 20, NO'. 4 (NO'v., 1992): 674. 
68 Chandran Kukathas, "Are There Any Cultural Rights?" PO'litical Theory, Vo1.20, 
No. 1 (Feb., 1992): 113-4. . 
69 Will Kymlicka, "ToleratiO'n and its Umits," 158. 
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In the face of such minorities, Rawls has become less willing to defend 
comprehensive liberalism but is still \villing to impose 1iberal political 
institutions. A more appropriate response, 'r believe, is to continue 
defending comprehensive liberalism based on autonomy as a general 
value, but bec orne more cautious about imposing the full set of liberal 
po1itical institutions on nonliberal minorities.70 
Kymlicka would rather impose liberal values on cultural minorities, 
than liberal institutions, and grant them autonomy through their own 
institutions. l wonder how well this solution remedies what John Rawls had 
hoped to avoid (affirming the unreasonability of those that cannot exit the 
framework of their comprehensive doctrines) 71. 
For Kymlicka, restricting autonomy to public political contexts, leads to 
the incoherent abandonment of autonomy in private. He wonders why certain 
actions should be deemed acceptable only within the confines of private 
cultural lives. What l find astoundingis that Kymlicka refuses to take seriously 
Bernard Williams' s critique of the liberal tendency to abstract from what makes 
individual's lives meaningful and livable. After all, Kymlicka premises his 
demand for group rights on the fact that cultural communities provide depth 
and meaning to the lives of its members. If this is so, how can they be expected 
70 Kymlicka, "Two Models ofPluralism and Tolerance," 96. 
71 As Newey remarks: "The attempt to forge political relationships on the basis of 
moral consensus cornes to seem quixotic, and creates the blind spot over toleration ... 
if one of other party fails to join the reasonable consensus, it is therefore unreasonable, 
and so beyond the pale oftoleration.,,71 
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to turn away from their commitment to the context of choice that brings them to 
care about life, let alone politics? Eschewing individual' s life plans on thé basis 
that they are noxious to autonomy is no better a compromise than failing to 
show respect for individual commitments to minority cultural communities. By 
Rawls's account, we would permit 'internaI restrictions' against community 
members. Kymlicka, on the other hand, would sacrifice toleration in favor of 
privileging autonomy. But if individuals are eligible to State protection on the 
basis ofbasic rights, they could always choose to leave their commurtities when 
they transgress a threshold which individualsdeem acceptable (this is thé 
solution which Chandran Kukathas provides). Rather than restrict the right to 
freedom of association, Kukathas opts to sacrifice the notion of autonomy, in 
. cases where groups decide not to privilege autonomy ovèr and above group 
commitments. To recall, Kymlicka was sensitive to Okin's proposaI that 
'internaI restrictions' be expanded to include more subtle forms of 
discrimination and autonomy-limiting norms. If 'internaI restrictions' were to 
include the more subtle forms of discrimination women face, and Kymlickahas 
pledged his commitment to this outcome, th~ State could suggest that cultural 
norms be reformed when minority cultural groups (or any group it seems) 
refuses to reassess (i.e. refuses to instate the changes as the State sees fit) and 
revise their practices. So, the State ought to enforce gender equality until the 
most subtle forms of discrimination against female members is extinct. What 
practices does this include, 1 wonder? Even Refotm Judaism could be accused 
of upholding sorne subtle forms of discrimination against its members. More 
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problematically, Orthodox Judaism would be forced to enter into a dialogue 
with the State about altering many of the customs it presently upholds. Should 
, 
Jewish Orthodox synagogues even be expected by the State to have female 
rabbis that perform gay marri age ceremonies in which the equality of husband 
and wife is upheld? Even a Reform Jew should finq this suggestion deplorable 
(not on a religious basis, but on a human one). Does tolerance not exist in order 
to allow religion and cultures the freedom to interpret their norms? The cultural· 
members of thes~ groups, 1 am willing to bet, would be outraged at the thought 
that the State could intervene whenever 'internaI restrictions' are perceived. 
This should give Will Kymlicka pause if his commitment to preserving cultural 
membership is even half as strong as he claims it to be since what Kymlicka 
would urge for is the acculturation of minority cultures, rather th an the 
rectification of injustice. 
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b. Chandran Kukathas and the associationist model of group 
rights 
Chandran Kukathas opposes Will Kymlicka's argument for group 
rights, but not on the basis that it award groups special protections. Chandran 
Kukathas also defends a notion of cultural toleration, which rests on the 
protection of group rights. But he and Kymlicka disagree in terms of one 
important consideration: According to Chandran Kukathas' defense of cultural 
toleration, societies should give communities greater autonomy over their 
members rather than intervene when group members' autonomy is at stake. He 
views this alternative as more tolerant of difference, because this arrangement 
would allow cultural communities to thrive, ev en when the liberal rights of their 
members are 'compromised' by virtue of belonging to the group. Kukathas 
believes liberalism should view "cultural communities more like private 
associations or, to use a slightly ~ifferent metaphor, electoral majorities.,,72 
. From a liberal point of view, the wish of minority cultures to live in accordance 
1 
. with their own princip les must "be respected not because the culture has the 
right to be preserved but because individuals should be free to associate: to 
form communities and to live by the terms of those associations 73. Cultural 
association, which simultaneously implies the freedom of disassociation on 
72 Chandran Kukathas, "Are there any cultural rights?" 115. 
73 Chandran Kukathas, "Are there any cultural'i'ights?" 115. 
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Kukathas' view, should be understood as follows: "an association of individuals 
whose freedom to live according to communal practices each finds acceptable 
is Of fundamental importance.74 Kymlicka, on· the other hand, "seeks to 
entrench cultural rights on a basis whicp itself undermines many forms of 
cultural community, specifically those that fail in their practices to conform to· 
the liberal norms of tolerance and· to honor the liberal ideal of 
autonomy.,,75Consequently, Kymlicka's theory leaves both communitarians and 
liberals yearning for more. Kukathas contends the basis of Kymlicka's 
argument for group rights is not sound from a liberal perspective in that the fact 
that individuals are born into injustice because they have not chosen to belong 
to a 'disadvantaged' culture is not grounds for establishing group rights because 
. none of us chose the starting point of our lives. The fortune or misfortune we 
are born into is to be blamed on nothing more than chance and happenstance. 
Misfortune does not limit itseI( to naissance: it plagues us in many forms that 
lie beyond our control throughout our lives. But the tragedy of life cannot 
simply be made to vanish by the magic of politics. It is a simple fact, which we 
must grapple with. This is not to say we must lay back and watch scenes of 
J 
injustice roll by. Of course governments should concern themselves with 
attempting to curb whatever tragic effects theycan. But this does not mean it is 
the role of politics to cure life of its every ill. We should regard anyone that 
c1aims we can with scoril and suspicion, just as a snake oil peddler would be 
. the beneficiary of skepticism. Secondly, to c1aim. that ail members of a minority 
74 Chandran Kukathas, "Are there any cultural rights?" 122, 
7S Chandran Kukathas, "Are there any cultural rights?" 122. 
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are equally disadvantaged or that group rights would help aH individuals of a 
group equally is to undermine the separateness of persons, and their ability to 
lay their own winding path through life. Kukathas asks: 
Even if the AustralianAborigines are collectively and, on average, the 
worst off in the society.:. there are man y (even if, arguably not enough), 
Aborigines who are better off richer, better educated, more powerful -
than themajority of Australians. So, why not give other Australians the 
same rights?76 
The pursuit of projects is what ÎS' most endemic to individuals' lives, 
according to Kukathas. Human beings are such that they obtain fulfillment 
from their pursuits. The patticularized pursuit of happiness, of wealth, of 
power, of knowledge and so on is what makes each person unique. It is what 
fills us with hope about tomorrow and the next day. The design of projects is 
the framework of life, essentially. But individual projects exist in contrast to 
group projects. Sometimes, individuals unite in their aim to pursue a certain 
goaL This is what freedom of association (and dissociation) allows us to 
accomplish. The freedom of association consecrates the power of the group 
over the individual and the necessity that individuals within an association 
respect the authority of the group and its values. If they wish to disagree, they 
must do so from within the group, and not through an appeal to the State to 
intervene on their behalf. Groups are safe from intrusions as long as they 
resp~ct the dut y to refrain from the cruel treatment of its members; not solely 
76 Chimdran Kukathas, "Are there any cultural rights?" 123. 
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because there is a risk of the State stepping in, but also because the groups 
members would likely opt to exit and exercise "their enforceable daims against 
the community,,77 if their protestations were taken lightly. To the extent that 
their ways of life would have external effects, groups would also likely be 
affected by society's responses (such as the prosecution for damages in the 
event that they are at fault for a damage they cause to' one of their 
compatriots)78. In short, the freedom of association, like most rights, is not 
absolute. 
Chandran Kukathas' théory of toleration turns of the belief that culture 
is essential to its members, and that without a propër recognition of culture, 
political society undercuts the extent to which its citizens may lead lives filled 
with meaningfulness. In "Cultural Toleration", Kukathas illustrates what he 
believes cultural tolerance ought to consist in. He starts with a differentiation 
between practices that harm cultural group members and practices that harm the 
members of society at 'large. In his own words, Kukathas states: 
A distinction can nonetheless be drawn between practices which are 
objectionable because they are morally intolerable in themselves or 
because they harm individuals in the groups that carry them out, and 
practices whichare objectionable because they harm the wide~ society 
more directly.79 
77 Chandran Kukathas, "Are there any cultural rights?," 128. 
78 Chandran Kukathas, "Are there any cultural rights?," 128. 
79 Chandran Kukathas, "Cultural Toleration," in Ethnicityand Group Rights: NOMOS 
XXXIX, eds. Ian Shapiro and Will Kymlicka (New York: N~w York University Press, 
1997),70. 
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His essay chooses to focus upon the practices which seem objectionable yet do 
not directly harm the wider society. The conflicts of rights that result from 
attempting to se.ttle sorne traditional cultural practices with the equal status of 
men and women could be one such practice. In this case, the clash between 
these rights is not occasioned by danger to the broader society but because the 
practices are morally intolerable in themselves. Having made this distinction, 
Kukathas makes the ends of his argument c1ear: he desires to expose the f1aws 
. within Will Kymlicka's deferise of special recognition for minority cultures, 
alongside a commitment to autonomy. To recall, cultural protection, on 
. Kymlicka's view, ought to be granted only in so far as minority groups. 
"respect certain liberal norms,,80. Theproblem Kukathas identifies, like Glenn 
Newey, is that "toleration is not possible when minority practices go against 
the values implicit in the public sphere: values which have already been 
establishéd.,,81 Thus, minorities that do not operate according to the values 
implicit in the public sphere "will be restructured (so far as it is practicable) to 
be brought into accord with majority practice.,,82 Like Newey, whose argument 
1 will elaborate in a few pages, Kukathas sees the necessity to accord with 
majority practice, as compromising the toleration ofminority cultures because 
the principle liberals use to decide who qualifies as a subject of toleration is 
settled prior to an'y analysis. Thus, toleration holds no value in itself. 
80 Chandran Kukathas, "Cultural Toleration," 76. 
81 Chandran Kukathas, "Cultural Toleration," 78. 
82 Chandran Kukathas, "Cultural Toleration," 78. 
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Kukathas believes toleration should be valued in itself because "it is the 
condition which gives judgments worth."83 Since reason is only held to be 
valuable in public and because disagreement is the cornerstone of liberal .. 
democracies, we must allow public disputes over the good life to take place. 
Toleration as a stand-al one value allows th.is since, "as long as toleration 
prevails, and no one tries to compel or manipulate the other to live differently, 
reason also prevails.,,84 Permitting toleration to operate only within bounds 
compatible with liberal autonomy would mean forsaking public reason, or at 
least foreclosing il. But Kukathas would have us to do the opposite, thereby 
expanding the realm in which public reason operates so that we conceive of the 
public realm "as an area of convergence of different moral practices."S5 
Because allowing more difference risks limiting stability and social 
unit y for the sake of carving room out for toleration. Kukathas states: 
My point is that stability and social unit y in this sense can only be bought 
at the cost of toleration. This is because articulating a political conception 
of justice, and presenting it as the first principle governing conduct the 
public realm, subordinates toleration, entrenches a particular 
comprehensive moral conception, andexcludes certain mural ideals as 
unacceptable.86 
Faced with both outcomes, he concludes we should privilege greater toleration 
over social unit y . 
. 
. 83 Chandran Kukathas, "Cultural Toleration," 79 . 
. 84 Chandran Kukathas, "Cultural Toleration," 82. 
85 Chandran Kukathas. "Cultural Toleration," 84. 
86 Chandran Kukathas, "Cultural ToJeration," 86. 
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The cultural toleration Kukathas defends seems to be the step that 
follows disallowing the State's a'uthority over the salvation of men's souls. If 
the State may no longer determine the proper path to salvation, it would seem 
logical it could also not settle the practices whichcllitures may ascribe to. If 
this is so, the State has no authority over those that do not subscribe to 'its . 
version of the good life, butonly over those that abide by its vision of morality. 
This expansion of toleration carries us to a type of social structure wherè 
higher moral principles, determined by the majority do not decide but only 
participate in the moral debates of the day. There is no authoritative moral 
voice from this perspective, but only a community of communities that enfolds 
a lively debate, absent of definitive answers. The debate itself, and not the 
consensus it engenders, is the final end of such a 'society of societies'. 
Kukathas does not defend special group rightsfor cultural minorities. 
Against Kymlicka, he argues that society' s most disadvantaged deserve rights 
'to protect themselves regardless of their group affiliations.S7 This stems from 
Jibe~al equality's concern with providing individuals, rather than groups with 
equal rights. He states: "if we are concerned about equality, it is about equality 
among individuals rather than among groups and we. then give ail individuals 
the "same" rights."ss Furthermore, Kukathas argues that if the right to cultural 
protection is a derivative right rather than a basic right, the way the right to a 
guide dog for blind persons is a derivative right stemming from the basic right 
to equal opportunity. If the derivative right is legitimate, from the liberal point 
S7 Chandran Kukathas, "Cultural Rights Again: A Rejoinder to Kymlicka," 674. 
88 Chandran Kukathas, "Cultural Rights Agairi," 675. 
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of view, we must give cultural protection to newcomers as weIl as longstanding 
minority cultures. Kukathas grounds his theory of cultural toleration on another 
type of right altogether: the freedom of association. Kukathas believes societies 
.should uphold the freedom of association in order to provide individuals with 
greater control over the groups they desire to belong to. This would mean 
multiplying the voices in the public sphere of reason. When faced with the 
choice to honor individual rights or cultural differences, Kukathas would side 
with the defense of cultural difference89 • In the face of a cultural dilemma, 
which would eitheroccasion external review or internai review of the conflict, 
Kukathas would regard the freedom of association as paramount, leaving 
individuals within the group to settle on a solution. In Kukathas' words, his 
option would be "to leave the terins of association to be determined by the 
community in question:'90 
In short, Kukathas advocates for a version of liberalism "in' which 
different ways of lifecan coexist, even if sorne of those ways of life do not 
value equality and autonomy.,,91 Thus, his insistence that Kymlicka's desire to 
reformulate liberalism in order to accommodate group rights is inconsistent 
with liberal equality does not harm his own theory because he does not seek to 
reconcile group rights with liberaL equality. His d,esire is simply to free 
. individuals from a dut Y to the State, if they wou Id rather associate with another 
group. On his view, if individuals happen to be part of a group, they must 
89 Chandran Kukathas, "Cultural Rights Again," 679. 
90 Chandran Kukathas, "Cultural Rights Again," 679. 
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accept the terms of association are to be dictated by the group alone, and would 
thereby not be subjected to external scrutiny should conflicts of values arise. 
Kymlicka's theory asks us to recognize a special kind of rights that 
groups have as well as the rights which all individuals are subject to regardless 
of their group affiliation. In the event that conflict would ariSe within a group'; 
the group members whose autonomy was violated could seek external 
protection from the State. Thus, Kymlicka asks we do away with a rather 
important liberal concern: that of recognizing the individual over the group. 
This aim, John Rawls made famous in the first principle of justice he derived. 
Personally, 1 was rather surprised by Kymlicka's use of Rawls' Theory of 
Justice to legitimate the notion of group rights, since 1 had always associated 
its final end with a critique of the tendency to counterbalance the rights of 
individuals in favor of the majority. Given the context of the Civil Rights 
movement within which the Theory of Justice came to fruition, 1 had 
understood Rawls' aim as trying to legitimate civil rights that the majority was 
illegitimately withholding from worth recipients (In the case of the Civil Rights 
. movement, women and black Americans). Nevertheless, Kymlicka's ambitious 
project has received much attention for its novel suggestion that liberalism 
requires we give minority cultures special rights so that their group can have 
the same chance at survival as the majority culture. 
Kukathas' theory of tolerationraises many interesting questions but the 
most remarkable one, 1 think, is the State's role. What is the State's role, if not 
to arbitrate the conflicts its many cultures engender?When conflict occurs, 
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most groups tum to the State for answers. On Kukathas' view, the State's role 
is observational rather than prescriptive. It seems odd that when individuals 
seek help from the broader society, which lies beyond their particular groups, 
the govemment should, as a policy, throw its hands up. The State would 
instead, idly stand by waiting to receive the individuals that choose, by virtue . 
of the fieedom of assoCiation, to exit the groùps they ·belong to when conflict 
. cannot be resolved from within community borders. My point does not aim to 
defend Kymlicka's view since 1 do not believe the State should not be the sole 
arbiter of morality. 
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c. Michel Seymour's theory of collective rights 
Michel Seymour has presented a veritable critique of a liberal defense of group 
rights, grounded in ethical individualism. According to him, If we are to 
vindicate collective rights, we must cure liberalism ofthis negative association. 
Consequently, Seymour clarifies that we must view 'internaI restrictions' as the 
logical consequence of a societal cultures' capacity for self-determination. 
Giving societal cultures proper recognition would bring us to view 
societal cultures in the framework of a multi-nation state as autonomous 
sources of moral worth and their autonomy as valuable as the autonomy 
of individuals. So there would no longer be any reason to hold that 
individuals have an absolute priority over societal cultures.92 
On this view, societal cultures could be given priority over their individual 
members, bringing us t6 a realm,similar to whatChandran Kukathas proposes, 
but for very different reasons, and with a radically different outcome. 
We have seen that Chandran Kukathas's theory proposes we adopt a 
model 'society of societies'. His theory would permit individuals to exit the 
social bonds if and when they pre fer to subscribe to another association's 
precepts. Despite the greater autonomy Chandran Kukathas gives groups, 
however, they are nevertheless encapsulated within the greater social structure 
of a traditional nation state. Michel Seymour prefers the abandonment of the 
92 Michel Seymour, The Fate of the Nation State (Montreal: McGill-Queen's 
University Press, 2004), 111. 
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ethical individualism characteristic of Kymlicka' s theory so that we may carve 
out room within which societal cultures could exercise their autonomy, while 
also jettisoning the typical model of the nation state, which Kukathas takes for, 
granted. Consequently, "an ethical pluralism that can accommodate both 
individuals and societal cultures,,93 is proposed. Both individual and societal 
cultures' rights are asserted as fundamental. To recall, Chandran Kukathas 
bases his model on a nation state within which other societies exist. Seymour's 
requires the redefinition of the nation state, since the societal cultures that . 
constitute a particular State have a right and lay a claim to their own 
institutions, and not mere exemption from the actual state apparatus in place. In . 
, . . 
light of this fact, the autonomy given to societal cultures will often imply 
internaI restrictions, as in the case of language laws in Quebec. Thus, "the 
distinction betweenexternal protections and internaI restrictions cannot stand" 
since "a regime of collective rights for a minority nation within the state cannot 
avoid imposing some (reasonable) restrictions on the rights of individuals 
within the nation.,,94 Since "external protections inevitably lead to internaI 
restr~ctions,,,95 Kymlicka will have to do away with this distinction if he is as 
committed to language rights as he .claims, since this particular 'external 
protection' yields an 'internaI restriction' that inhibits the rights of minorities 
within the group from rational revision oftheir life plans or even revision of the 
societal structure that encompasses them. Since Kymlicka supports language 
93 Michel Seymour, The Fate of the Nation State, 111. 
94 Michel Seymour, The Fate of the Nation State, 114. 
95 Michel Seymour, The Fate of the Nation State, 114. 
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laws, he will have to make significant modifications to his theory. As it stands, 
he has stated that internaI restrictions are· sufficient grounds for bringing the 
minority culture into dialogue with the State, in the hopes of reforming the rules 
, 
that transgress the autonomy of its members. On this view, those in Quebec that 
are unsatisfied with the language Iaws that impose aburden on them will have a 
vested interest inpromoting Kymlicka's theory. Michel Seymour, on the other 
hand, will not. If "Kymlicka is willing to accept internaI restrictions, but only in 
so far as they. serve to protect the minority from the majority,,96, he will do so at 
the expense of collective tights because peoples should have the right to several 
'internai restrictions' in the goal of fostering a common civic identity~ 
according to Seymour: They are as follows: 
Peoples have the right to impose reasonable restrictions such as the 
promotion and protection of a'common public language (compatible with 
the protection and promotion of minority languages), a corn mon public 
culture. (compatible with the promotion and protection of minority 
cultures), and a common public history (compatiblewith the promotion 
and protection of the historical minorities).97 
Ail liberal societies impose restrictions of their individuailiberty to a degree for 
the sake of fostering a common public culture and these cases must not be 
interpreted "as a case where collective rights override individual rights.,,98 
These cases are what a common civic identity requires. But isn't it the case that 
96 Michel Seymour, The Fate of the Nation State, 1 ]4. 
97Michel Seymour, The Fate of the Nation State, 114. 
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a common public cillture can alienate its citizens and create cases where 
individual rights are overridden? Isn't the case of a societal culture burdening a 
minority group precisely what motivates Michel Seymour'sargument? It may 
not be the case every time but in special cases there is a clear offense, as in 
cases of a societal culture that imposes one view of civic identity at odds with 
another societal culture' s identity. Such is precisely the case in the debate 
between Quebec and Canada, where different conceptions of civic identity have 
apparently led to individual rights being overridden (or perhaps it is but 
collective rights that have been violated. Would that offense be any lesser or 
greater?) So sorne problematic cases do yield a conflict that must be settled by 
weighing one interest over another. Such cases are the unhappy consequence of 
professing a view of community which cannot consider a minority as a part of 
its own, but only as a segment of the population whose rights should not be 
trampled notwithstanding their separateness. The view 1 will conclude in 
defense of in a few pages does not view this acceptable, and for differences 
other than those her~tofore elaborated by Michel Seymour. 1 believe we must 
avoid recalcitrant inward-gazing that does not see "the need to constrain the 
rights of citizens'by imposing a common public structure of culture, as long as 
it is compatible with the preservation of minority cultures within the nation,,99 
as appropriate. Why should each societal culture foster its own civic identity, as 
Seymour claims it must, rather than enter into a state of conflict, of 
confrontation, of communication with the cultures that surrourrd it? ln other 
99 Michel Seymour, The Fate of the Nation State, 116. 
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words, why not hope for a better alternative by which we are aIl relevant to the 
tenus of agreement and disagreement we end up fostering? Why focus on one 
point in a societal culture's history, and herrnetically se al it off from growth and 
interaction with the forces that put its immortality at stake? Perhaps Michel 
Seymour believes ensuring the self-determination of a societal culture is the 
precondition to a thriving)public interaction, but l am concerned that these 
many steps ahead would lead to a few steps back, in terms of viewing one 
another as part of one cornrnunity. 
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d. 'Mutuality'and 'murality' in conflict 
Ingrid Creppell buttresses her argument on a historical narrative that 
explains the progression of equality, which has culminated in the relative 
equality of our day. She seeks to replace the passivity of non"-interference, 
classically associated with toleration, with a more active conception. Thus, 
Ingrid Creppell remarks: 
The virtue of restraint is a great one, but the innovation in the policy of 
toleration between radically unequal opponents is not reducible to 
"constraint." The fact is that restraint is motivated because of a 
preexisting will to relationship which thereby sets the stage for 
institutions of politicàl mutuality ... Today we do live in conditions of 
relative equality. The ideal of toleration does not become superfluous 
because of this fact; rather, different aspects of its normative force come 
to·the foreground. The conventionalliberal solution to conflict - public 
neutrality - is strained when demands for recognition and interaction ask 
for more than blindness to difference in the public sphere. lOo 
In light of the greater equality between individuals, which characterizes . 
liberal societies, Creppell urges us to adopt a view ?f toleration that rests on 
mutuality rather than merely on self-restraint. We thereby replace restraint with 
"an idea of a specific type of political-social relation, the fundamental feature of 
100 Ingrid Creppell, "Toleration, Politics, and the Role of Mutuality ," in Toleration and 
its Limits: NOMOS XLVIII, eds. Melissa S. Williams and Jeremy Waldron (New 
York: New York University Press, 2008). 317. 
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which is the maintenance of relationship in the midst of the potential for 
conflict due to disagreement or difference.,,101 She believes tolerati(;m involves 
"a will to relationship.,,102 In our environment of relative equality, the 
mutuality, which stemmed from the 'will to relationship' allows us to view an 
important deficit in traditional views of toleratiQn; their norm of sheer non-
interference is not what mutuality requires. We must take diversity seriously 
and give due consideration t.o 'identity', all the while preventing the 
particularities of identity from giving rise to a departure or secession from 
public life when conflict arises. Toleration requires that we approach and 
resolve conflicts with diversity in mind. Thus, we cannot simply ignore or 
marginalize the difference that abounds: we must confront it with a 'will to 
relationship' (a desire to engage with difference), and constantly remind 
ourse Ives of the mutuality that birids us together (we cannot simply efface the 
equality of others). 
While Ingrid Creppell views toleration spawning from 'mutuality' and 
the accompanying notion of 'will to relationship', Glenn Newey is more 
skeptical about the attitudes that toleration rests on. He does not view the 
mutuality of the relationship between those that tolerate and the tolerated as an 
essential condition of toleration. 
,Glenn Newey remarks that "what counts as toleration, and hence its 
scope as a value or virtue, will be shaped by explicit or tacit assumptions about 
101 Ingrid CreppeJ!, "Toleration, Politics, and the Role of Mutuality ," 3l7-8. 
102 Ingrid Creppell, "Toleration, Politics, and the Role of Mutuality," 318. 
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the nature of toleration as a concept,,\o3. On this basis, he accuses Ingrid 
Creppell's view "that only those political relationships which disphlY the ideal 
of mutuality instantiate toleration." 104 This objection cuts deep since it seems to 
assert rather oddly that the very genealogy that gave 'birth to toleration. (the 
Wars of Religion) was not à proper subject of toleration (since the parties 
) 
involved were not committed to mutuality as Ingrid Creppell defines it). 
Furthermore, Creppell' s idealist bend is "peculiarly inappropriate to toleration, 
which ... only becomes politically contentious when a conflict breaks out 
between people who are not acting tolerantly.,,\05 In allthese cases, it is c1ear 
that the precondition of 'mutuality' is rather astray. In fact, if 'mutuality' were 
present, "there would be no problem to solve~",06 In light of this fact, Glenn 
Newey is correct in pronouncing oth~r projects which depend on values which 
toleration very sel dom typifies (such as Anna Elisabetta Galeotti' s view that 
toleration should embody the value of recognitionJ07), conceptually flawed 
from the start since these theorists tend to assert values which, if present, would 
have solved the problem before it appeared. These prior values usually have the 
consequence of negating the worth of toleration, since conflicts would 
seemingly not require tolerance but 'mutuality' or 'recognition' in order to be 
solved, in which case their theories have little to do with toleratiofl. Instead, 
they state solutions that do not involve the conceptual apparatus proper to 
lm Glen Newey, "Toleration, Poli tics and the Role of Murality," 363. 
104 Glen Newey, "Toleration, Politics and the Role of Murality," 364. 
105 Glen Newey, "Toleration, Poli tics and the Role of Murality ," 365 ~ 
106 Glen Newey, "Toleration, Politics and the Role of Murality ," 365. . 
107 Anna Elisàbetta GaJeotti, ToJeration as Recognition (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002). 
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tolerance: they eschew tolerance altogether. Attempts to rid conflict of conflict 
basically sidestep a problem that needs solving. 
In contrast to Creppell, Newey would prefer we refrain from "building 
normative commitments into the conceptual analysis of toleration"108 in order 
to leave room for social progression to fill the void which remains. By avoiding 
normative content for the value of toleration, we free up the grasp which certain 
values have over the evaluation that must occur case by case, through a full 
analysis of each side's arguments. On Newey's view, and since. the content of 
toleration is contingent upon further evaluation, toleration will not always 
suffice to resolve conflicts when "eachparty is acting tolerantly, relative to its 
own evaluative beliefs.,,109 To quote Newey: 
Opposing values both trigger the initial conflict and opposing views as to 
how to act tolerantly with regard to it. Wc can take as an example the 
debate over the English laws on blasphemy, which protect the established 
Anglican religion. Muslims can and do argue that toleration requires that 
the laws be extended to protect aIl (major) religious denominations, 
including Islam. Secularists argue that the tolerant course of action is ~o 
disestablish religious disabilities of the kind enshrined in the existing 
blasphemy laws by repealing them. 1 JO 
Adopting a view of toleration that is void of a predetermined normative content 
frees the way for a proper analysis and weighing of reasons, rather than a 
108 Glen Newey, "Toleration, Poli tics and the Role of Murality," 373. 
109 Glen Newey, "Toleration, Politics and the Role of Murality," 373. 
110 Glen Newey, "Toleration, Politics and the Role of Murality," 374 .. 
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deductive approach, which self-determines the content oftoleration prior to any 
proper examination. This frees the way for those concerned to state their 
reasons, as wellas the State's determination of a fitting solution. As with any 
conflict of values, there will be loss. But at least one can state on this model that 
the parties' whom the tolerator is addressing have had the chance to properly 
express their reasons and their motivation for seeking immunity from state 
intervention. 1 think this solution is far more equitable than a pre-determined . 
algorithmic mode of reasoning or a situation in which no arguments are 
presented, such as in the case of Chandran Kukathas who sealsthe debate off 
from State intervention from the start. Thus, the State has both less to say that 
. , 
on Creppell's method, and more to say than on Kukathas' method for 
adj~dicating conflict. This also accords well with Jeremy Waldron's alternative' 
that places much emphasis on the justification, which the parties in question 
must present, in order to obtain freedom from interference or assent from the 
\ . 
State. 
l do disagree however, with the fallout of Newey's argument. Newey 
names his view of toleration 'toleration as murality' in contrast to Creppell's 
emphasis on mutuality. Newey's notio~ oftoleration accepts "the role ofwalls - . 
) 
real or virtual - in containing antagonisms" but also in creating a secure domain 
in which civic conflicts can be played OUt.,,111 Walls may als~ be viewed as the 
natural environment that conflicts of value take place within or, alternatively, 
111 Glen Newey, "Toleration, Politics and the Role of Murality," 374. 
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the "de facto space in which conflicts are contained"ll2. Murality, unlike ideal 
theory does not require definitive moral consensus, but favors security ll3. 
According to Newey, "walls are the preconditions of other kinds of good, 
including tolèration" since "only once these preconditions are met can there be 
politics, and the processes which make toleration possible.,,114 The walls of 
'toleration as murality' have a dual role: they exist to protect individuals from 
the State and from each other. Newey concludes we should not seek to define 
toleration in relation to a higher value but to understand toleration in terms of 
murality and the boundedness that he views as the characteristic of political 
subjects. He believes, that instead of defining toleration, we ought to "allow 
[toleration] to become what it is: a concept which, by signaling the presence of 
what is alien in our midst, marks the shifting frontier between politics and 
war.,,1l5 Accordingly, we ought also to abandon hèpe for what is likely 
\ 
impossible (the universal accommodati~n of difference) and recognize the fact 
that "the secure polis can indeed endure some difference without courting 
disaster.,,1\6 What troubles me at the end of the analysis is the approach that 
Newey adopts in relation to difference. Glen Newey argues for a conception of 
toleration, which shèds any association with a higher moral principle. Glen 
Newey'sargument depends on a critique of Ingrid Creppell's view thatpolicy 
decisions ought to be characterized by bç>th reasoning and results, which are 
112 Glen Newey, "Toleration, Politics and the Rol~ of Murality," 375. 
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driven towards a goal of sustaining the mutual benefit of our common but 
. diverse lives. 1I7 
'Muralism' boxes difference away neatly where it can exist safe from 
outside interaction. From a sec ure location, marginal groups exist as a danger to 
no one but themselves. Newey's conclusion is devoid of any merit for a society 
·like our own. Here we are, aIl stuck together, and it· is time that we start 
attempting to settl~ into a view of culture more compatible with political teality. 
Cloistering groups from public interconnectedness' is not a solution to. a 
) 
problem, but the creation of another challenge. It is an ethos that requires 
individuals to either hide their true selves, or bec orne reclus ive in an effort to 
obtain safety from incursion; Neither option is appropriate since waIls, despite 
the temporary shelter from the storm of moral disagreement they provide, oblige 
us to exit center stage of civil society. 1 think we should revise .Newey's 
conclusion in favOr of a more hospitable framework for dissent: one that 
recognizes the inevitability of conflict and does not attempt to solve it away 
theoretically before the facts, but that also views beings of our kind as capable 
of comprehending and apprehending each other. Is it possible that by our very 
nature we come to discover what is alien and, over time, make it our own, 
mixing what jumps out at us with what is already deeply planted within our 
being? 1 would like now to turn to an approach, which 1 think holds such 
promise: A promise that is not entirely close-ended; but that leaves room for the 
newness that will come into the world. 
117 Ingrid Crepell, "Toleration, Politics and the Role of Mutuality," 332. 
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e. Jeremy Waldron's cosmopolitan alternative 
In What is Cosmopolitan? Waldron's gQal is twofold: he proposes a 
no~el way of regarding culture, and an expectation that derives from this 
\::onceptualization of. culture. In an article that· preceded "What is 
Cosmopolitan?" Waldron offered a response (or perhaps a challenge) to 
authors that view the necessity of preserving minority cultures. ln "Minority 
Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative", Waldron defended a view of 
individuals unencumbered by their cultural baggage. In this piece, Waldron 
c1aimed culture might be cast aside as freely as it may be acquired. 
Accordingly, by partaking in ail the cultures of the worM, the cosmopolitan 
subject walks unfettered by his culture and the cultures around him. This brings 
Waldron's protagonist to bask in the pluralism that surrounds him, delighting 
in the variety on offer. Waldron also questions whether notion that culture is 
integral and the allegation that "there really are such things as distinct 
cultures.',118 He concludes that the boundaries that lie between cultures are 
fluid. In light of the boundlessness of culture, cultural presérvation would 
require severing culture from the test of time and the fickle whims of its 
members since the volatility of cultural membership is such that cultures 
cannot be preserved once their members are led astray by other alternatives. 
118 Will Kymlicka, "From Enlightenment Cosmopolitanism to Liberal Nationalism," in 
Politics in the Vemacular: nationalism, multÎCulturalism and citizenship (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), 210. 
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Kymlicka remarks that on Waldron's view, "the only way to preserve a distinct 
culture intact ... would be to cut it off artificially from the general course of 
human events.,,119 Kymlicka criticizes Waldron's account for failing to realize 
the cosmopolitan individual' s meandering ways are "simply a case of enjoying 
opportunities provided by the pluralistic societal culture that characterizes 
contemporary ... society,,120, whose plurality allows the cosmopolitan to 
partake in the things he finds "worthwhile in other cultures, [integr~te] it into 
[his] own practices, and [pass] it on to the subsequent generations.,,121 
Kymlicka believes no proper liberal society would view "the process of 
interacting with and learning from other cultures as a threat to 'purity' or 
'integrity' , rather than as an opportunity for enrichment.,,122 He accuses Jeremy 
Waldron of mislmderstanding the aim of minority nationalists since they do not 
seek to prote ct the integrity of their culture l23 but its distinctness over time. To 
quote Kymlicka: 
Liberal nationalists do not seek to preserve their 'authentic' culture, if 
that means living the same way that their ancestors did centuries ago, 
unable to learn from other peoples and cultures. As 1 noted earlier, they 
want to live in modern democratic societies, and to share in a common 
Western civilization. What the Québecois or the Flemish want, for 
example, is to preserve their existence as a culturally distinct group -
119 Kymlicka, "From Englightenment Cosmopolitanism to Liberal Nationalism," 210-1. 
120 Kymlicka, "From Englightenment Cosmopolitanism to Liberal Nationalism," 21O-l. 
121 Kymlicka, "From Englightenment Cosmopolitanism to Liberal Nationalism," 211. 
122 Kymlicka, "From Enlightenment Cosmopolitanism to Liberal Nationalism," 211. 
123 Kymlicka, "From Enlightenment Cosmopolitanism to Liberal Nationalism," 211. 
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always adapting and transforming their, culture, of course, but resisting 
the pressure to abandon entirely their group life and assimilate into the 
larger society.124 
\ 
"What is Cosmopolitan?" is a rejoinder to Waldron's previous article. 
Here, hedips into Immanuel Kant's wellspring of ideas, in order to show how 
. "cosmopolitan right, in Kant's sense, makes demands on the way we behave 
and comport ourselves in domestic politics,,125. He starts by responding to 
Kymlicka's criticism by explaining what he did not me an to imply in 
"Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternatïve". He did not mean to 
suggest that: 
Someone immersed in the life of a particular culture swallows his culture 
whole, so to speak, so that his identity is as secure as the identity of the 
culture, uncontaminated by the intrusion of alien practices or ideas; 
whereas someone who lives the c6smopolitan experience wears a coat of 
many colors, 'a bit of this and a bit of that' , an identity composed of 
many fragments, or perhaps more accurately just many fragments of 
culture coexisting in the life of a single person, with the question of 
identitysidelined or rejected as distracting, redundant or irrelevant.126 
What he meant to emphasize, the urban centers of the world can provide 
insight inta. 
124 Will Kymlicka, "From Enlightenment Cosmopolitanism to Liberal Nationalism." 
212 .. 
125 Jeremy Waldron, "What is Cosmopolitan?;" Journal of Political Philosophy; vol. 8, 
no.2 (June 2000): 231. 
126 Jeremy Waldron, "What is Cosmopolitan?," 231. 
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Cities like New York, Paris, London and Bombay are the urbancenters of 
world culture; they àre great centers of trade, tourism and migration, 
where peoples and their traditions mingle and interact. They pay tribute to 
a central fact about human nature which the cosmopolitan, above ail, 
ought to be in the business of emphasizing and extolling. Humans are 
curious and adventurous animais: they travel, they migrate, they fight; and 
th~y plunder.127 
By the se natural processes, cultures come into contact with one another, 
inevitably changing what came before by introducing novel ways of 
encountering Iife. The 'distinctiveness of cultures' is an overstatement, as w~1l 
as an oversight of the things which unite us in spite of kilometers and oceans. 
When we seek to define the essence of a culture V\fe act as 'taxonomists', hoping 
to delineate ail the possible traits which make a culture unique but, according to 
Waldron, "a culture just is what it is, and its practices and rituals are constitutive 
of it in virtue of their place in a shared way of Iife, not in virtue of their 
perceived particularity .,,128. Likewise, members of a culture just do what they do 
despite and in spite of the cultural background. He states: 
One participates in a form of life. Advertising or announcing that this is . 
what one is doing is participation in another form of Iife - a different 
forin of life - a form of life <?n problematically related to the first. 129 
127.Jeremy Waldron, "What is Cosmopolitan?," 231. 
128 Jeremy Waldron, "What is Cosmopolitan?," 233. 
129 Jeremy Waldron, "What is Cosmopolitan?," 234. 
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When individualsassert their difference by contrasting their diss~mi1arity 
compared to the cultural background, they do 50 out of self-consciousness, out 
of a desire to be recognized .as different. But does this self-conscious assertion 
have any normative, rather th an purely descriptive weight? Waldron believes 
that, to the contrary, that the postmark of cultural beliefs cannot operate 
. . 
normatively, since it holds no justificatory weight. To identify the cultural 
origin of a norm is not the same as defending its truth or its legitimacy. This is 
Waldron's claim in the passage that follows l30: 
It seems very odd to regard the fact that something is 'our' norm that is, 
what we Irishmen or we Maori or we Americans do as part of the 
reason, if not the central reason, for having the norm, and for sustaining 
and foHowing it. l3l 
This is the correct posture for states to assume in encountering the great variety, 
characteristic of our moral universe. Rather than recoil from difference, States. 
130 This rather lengthy passage is also worth citing in full: "If; for example, 1 ask an 
eider of the group to which 1 belong why we have and follow a norm of monogamy, 
he may tell me a story about the need for reciprocity and equality between loyers and 
explain why this is difficult or impossibie in polygamous relationships, or he may tell 
me a story about the sun and the moon and about there being only one of each. Either 
way, that is the sort of thing that counts, in the group, as a reason for having and 
following the monogamy custom. True, 1 may not accept the reasoning that the group 
associates with the norm; or 1 may find the sun-and-moon story bewildering or 
unsatisfying. But if 1 do, that is aIl there is to say about the matter: 1 no longer 
understand .or respect the norm on the basis on which it claims my respect and 
understanding. 1 certainly do not show any respect for it rather 1 show a vain and 
self-preoccupied contempt for the norm itself by gutting it of its reasons, and 
replacing them as reasons with my own need to keep faith with iny own ·cultural roots. 
That is not the point of the monogamy requirement, and to think of itas the point, or 
party of the point, oreven as one reason among other, may be to give a quite 
misleading impression of how important the norm is supposed to be in this culture and 
what that importance is based upon." ("What isCosmopolitan?," 234). 
131 Jeremy Waldron, "What is Cosmopolitan? ," 234. 
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ought to bask in it, never pausing or hesitating to confront the variety, which it 
beholds. Rather than cause culture to be reclusive, and bubble-wrapped from 
outside interaction, the State ought to be gregarious and interminglein an 
earnest attempt to break the barri ers of isolation. Instead of being nonplussed at 
the thought of diversity, the Stateshould come into contact with its citizens, in 
a dialogl:le that reaches out for the reasons that buttressthe cultural support of a 
norm. lt is not necessarily individuals that to ought to move between cultures, 
but the State that ought to confront tpe morality of its inhabitants. As an 
alternative to the walls and ghettos of 'murality', the doistered free associàtions 
of Kukat?as' archipelago, or the liberalized millet system which Kymlicka' 
prefers, Waldron's cosmopolitanism implores the State to absorb the 
kaleidoscope of cultures in its midst and fold itself in a mélange of cultures. 
This stance does not demand that cultures betray their rootedness, but it does 
demand more from the State. The cosmopolitan norm asks the State to be 
critical of its own authority as weil as the authority of reasons cultures invoke. 
If the norms of our community are truly worth ~mbracing, we pay them 
disservice by merely attributing their importance to the fact that they derive 
from our culture, and not by virtue of "the substantive commitments that they 
embody."132 Cultural nonns ' 
make deep daims, powerful claims about what is important and whàt sort 
of thing are at stake in the areas of life that they govern. Those daims are 
usually held to be true (by those who make them), which means that they 
132 Waldron, "What is Cosmopolitan?," 235. 
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claim to offer to give a better account of what really matters th an the 
reasoning associated with the different n?rms and practices of the society 
next door or across the sea.133 
We owe it to oursel ves, to each other, to present the se reasons w hen con1licts 
arise over the version of the good we ought to privilege, the bad habits we 
should change, and the realm of uncertilÏnty we should permit to cohabit our 
certitude (as in the case of toleration). Is it not true, after aIl, that a cultural 
norm, and the reasons that make it authoritative, "claims to represent sorne 
repository of human wisdom as to the best way of doingthings."134 
\ 
If we are tolook for a better way of approaching conflict, that takes 
culture at face value and does not romanticize its worth prior to a critical 
examination of tre reasons which lie behind its ideas, we cannot depend on 
Kukathas' model. In then end, it is not his prioritization of toleration over 
security and stability, which is wrought with problems (although that is il 
concern we ought to take seriously) but his inability to realize that politics 
involvesconflict that boundaries and walls cannot prevent. Wh en such conflict 
occurs, we cannot turn away as though the se disagreements are somehow alien 
to us because we do not belong to the group in question. Ingrid Creppell's 
solution wrongly prevents eligibility to the debate since the principle by which 
we grant toleration alienates manY,reasons before their cas~ has even been 
stated. Newey and Kukathas, in different ways, change the context of the debate 
entirely soit alIo~s individuals to speak their mind, but insulates groups from 
133 Waldron, "What is Cosmopolitan?," 235. 
134 Waldron, "What is Cosmopolitah?," 236. 
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externat opposition: l'm not asking for an Inquisition, or a, "take no prisoners" 
attitude to' moral justification that would culminate in a widespread 
interrogation of those that betray a commitment to popularity morality, but for a 
quo warranto attitude to cultural reasoning. This is the attitude that 1 think 
should accompany toleration. 
If cultures persist despite the increasing Iiberalization of the State, it is 
because "cultural membership provides meaningful options, in the sense that 
'familiarity with a culture determines the boundaries of the imaginable'''135. 
Thus, when prompted.for the value of a practice or belief, cultures should be 
able to produce sorne kind of story or answer. The complications, which arise 
from multiculturalism, are the product of taking multiculturalism to mean an 
inability to demand explanations. Just because "each culture is distinct, with its 
own unique pattern of internai and external organization", we are not required to 
infer that "it must be judged on its own terms, with reference to the values that 
inform it,,136 or that the assessment of a cu1ture must operate from withi~ the 
culture. If it were so, Gurpreet Mahajan would be correct to be frustrated at the 
inability to challenge communities with controversial practices. Mahajan would 
be correct to ask the following "How do we then expect çhange to occur, 
especially since women are among the most vulnerable membersof the 
135 Will Kymlicka, "Freedom and Culture," in Multicultural Citizenship: a liberal 
theory of minority rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995),89. 
136 Gurpreet Mahajan, "Intra-group equality and cultural diversity," in Minorities 
within minorities: Equality, Rights and Diversity, eds. Avigail Eisenberg andJeff 
Spinner-Halev (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 93. 
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community and they may not count in community decisions?"137 Indeed: How 
could the State refuse to demand justification of oppressive practices? Prefixing 
abhorrent conduct with 'culturally sanctioned' does not render it acceptable. 
Culturally sanctioned kidnapping, or culturally sanctioned forced marriage 
should both be causes for concern, regardless of the cultures they stem from. 
None of us should be able to explain away violations of a person's dignity or 
humanity. The desire for a dignified human existence is something we should 
ail regard as a reasonable expectation. When someone appeals to his or her 
culture for justification (for example, "my culture permits the abuse of women 
when ... ") we have good reasonto ask why, for aIl intents and purposes, this 
should be relevant or compelling. In such cases, we are justified in responding 
that'we don't care. ln the same breath, not aIl culturally derived practices and 
beliefs should solieit such a reaction or provoke suspicion or enquiry (in fact, ( 
most shouldn't). There is clearly a limit to what we should ?emand explanation 
for. Most of the time, toleration will not compel us to do anything since, the 
majority of the time, culture is the provider of a meaningful context of choice 
that does not impinge on its individual members' humanity. 
The conundrum Susan Moller Okin's question ("Is Mtilticulturalism 
Bad for Women?") provoked may be answered in a variety of ways by the 
different forms of cultural toleration which Creppell, Newey, Kukathas, Brown 
and Kymlicka present. The State would, on Kymlicka and Creppell' s view, se~k 
to liberalize cultural practices that do not stem from 'autonomy' or 'mutuality'. 
137 Gurpreet Mahajan, "Intra-group equality and cultural diversity," 93. 
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Newey and Kukathas would prefer the State show restraint when acceptance or 
recognition is not possible. On their view, the State ought to substitute judgment 
for sk~pticism, thereby withholding any authoritative incursions into private 
inatters. Finally, Wendy Brown would like us to remain skeptical when 
dispensing judgment, since the tolérator often do es not hold himself to the high 
standard he imposes on others. The only alternative 1 think makes any sense at 
aIl is Waldron's notion of cosmopolitan ~ight, which compels us to consider the 
reasons the tolerator possesses for opposing a practice, in conjunction with the 
reasons individuals have forbelieving their beliefs or practices are worthwhile. 
Perhaps the benchmark is high, but it makes State arbitration possible, while not 
precluding any reasons on the basis that they do not derive from il higher 
principle such as 'mutuality' ,'autonomy', or 'recognition'. This stand point also 
affirms the due amount of humility Wendy Brown's critique cautions us to 
have. 
Additionally, 1 would like to highlight a further difference between 
Kymlicka's approach to conflicts of value and Waldron's. On Kymlicka's view, 
when there is disagreement within a community and 'internaI restrictions' are 
imposed so that reform of the controversial practice is made impossible, the 
State 'may freely intervene and at least attempt to liberalize practices that violate 
the principle of aut6nomy. This is based on the fact that .Kymlicka' s account of 
'Iiberal toleration' sees the values of autonomy and toleration as entwined. 
Kymlicka does not desire the separation of toleration and autonomy so that 
cultural practices can escape assessment in the goal of establishing w hether 
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liberalization is appropriate. The 'liberalization' or 'acculturation' of minority 
groups that betray a commitment to autonomy is not only permissible on 
Kymlicka's view; it is what liberal toleration requires States to attempt on 
behalf of its most powerless members. 
1 would like to spell out that this desire is at odds with what Waldron 
p~ts forward. While Waldron maydesire assessment of cultural practices, he 
doesnot impose a criterion that determines the lexical ordering of the arguments 
presented. The dut Y to assessment is bilateral. Assessment will be as critical of 
liberal principles as liberal principles woûld be of the reasons cultural minorities 
present. The dut Y to assessment shows respect for reasons, which lay beyond 
the pale of autonomy. In fact, Waldron specifically argues that the reason why 
cultural. ccimmunities ought to be expected to justify their practices is that they 
point to something of importance: they are positions on what is fundamentally 
right or wrong. On this basis, we have a dut Y to lend an ear to their reasons for 
valuing their principles. The faithful are not dismissed as unreasonable a priori 
but they are expected to explain the reasons that make the beliefs they hold 
compelling. Their dut y to justification does not exit the stage at the onset of 
'cultural' vindication. Waldron also cannot give backing to the solution that 
Kukathas endorses because it leads to the outright exemption from justification. 
Waldron's cosmopolitan alternative attributes us ail with the ability to justify 
ourselves, from the most devout individual to the die-hard autonomymongerer. 
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The second, phase of Waldron's argument appeals to Kant's analysis of 
the circumstances of cosmopolitan right. By virtUe of the fact we live on a 
bounded sphere that our curiosity pushes us to explore,means that we are bound 
to encounter new lands. Despite this inability, we have a tendency towards 
"un social sociability' that "combines man 's cosmopolitan curiosity about how 
others live, and about practices and traditions other than his own, with an 
extraordinary human reluctance to take others' practices seriously."138 The' 
variety of territories and cultures on this bounded sphere we inhabit me an that 
wherever we land, or whoever lands where we are, we willlikely be confronted 
with novel ways of regarding that which is morally compelling. Consequently, 
we will have to come to terms with each other, according to rather different 
arrangements since we will ail be exposing one another according to modes of 
reasoning that cannot be processed algorhithmically, and because each clash of 
values will mean different reasons. Thus, solving conflict remains a distant 
dream now' that our desire for exploration, for conquest and for distant 
encounters has been set in motion. Since "there are a hundred and one 
legitimate ways in which people might find themselves living side by side with 
J 
others of different cultures ... there is no telling who we will end up living 
alongside of, no telling who our neighbors may turn out to be,,,139 What ensues? " 
Tostart, we will be forced to come to grips with one another, and opting out of 
this dut Y is not, an option. We will also be forced to listen to each other's 
reasons, no matter the pain such a course of action may beget. 
138 Jeremy Waldron, "What is Cosmopolitan?", 237~8. 
139 Jeremy Waldron, "What is Cosmopolitan? ," 239. 
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, 
Kukathas's defense of community provokes a problem. Community in 
itself is not problematic, but when it is used to defend intolerance or to justify a 
lack of concern for the fale' of individuals that lie beyond its bounds, it 
becomes morallyreprehensible. In these cases community undergoes a 
transformation from the vessel of care and concern to the. vantage point of 
exclusivity, of repugnance for those that do not accord weil with its principles. 
'Under this matrix, 1 agree with Waldron that community members "will do 
everything in their power - including mobilizing the ideology of "community" 
itself - to ensure that those who are naked, shivering, fiIthy, unemployed, sick, 
/' . 
foreign, and destitute come nowhere near their gates and nowhere near the 
public places where they walk their prams or hold their barbecues."I40 Indeed, 
community can warp depending on one's perspective. From the internaI 
. perspective, a community shut off from the outside is safe; it is of comfort and 
reassurance to its members, because it is hard to duplicate the experience of 
being aroun'd like-mindedindividuals that confirm the soundness of our beliefs, 
and echo our concerns about life. But the capacity for hospitality and 
generosity of spirit is often duplicitous since every community has the ability 
to shut its doors, define its terms so that outsiders cannot benefit from the 
warmth their members feel. From the perspective of the shunned or 
marginalized individual, community is a sting in the tail. It is for this reason 
that Waldron points out: "In the real world, the word "community" is found 
140 Jeremy Waldron, "Secularism and the Limits of Community ," in Globalization 
Challenged: conviction, conflict, and community, by George Rupp (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2006), 56. 
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more commonly in the company of ternis like "gated.~"'141 The hope is that 
community can be redefined, to encompass the individuals that make our 
communities ill at ease and that community can move beyond "thefamiliar 
communitarian idea of humanity having been sorted already into a number of 
separate and mutually exclusive communities".142 Kukathas' view of culture· 
, 
cannot, then, be upheld since it implies communities or associations shut off 
from outsiders for the s~ke of self-determination. Waldron 's hope is that we 
will opt to regard community from a perspective other than that of exclusivity. 
We will then enforce a n'otion of community which does notshy away or 
disjoint themselves from others in an attempt to protect their beliefs, but will 
, 
come to see outsiders as neighbors in a joint society ~ 
The 'mutuality', which Creppell urges us to consider, is a gripping 
demand indeed. It compels us to look beyond the walls of our gated 
communities, both real and actual, beyond our ghettos and private clubs, and at 
each other. So while Glenn Newey is right to be skeptical about theories that 
qualify the right to toleration by means of an exclusive principle, his conclusion 
turns out to be an even harder pill to swallow since it culmiriates in a demand 
for the segregation of those that bother us, for the sake of security. If we ail 
.conceived of. and engaged in human relations on those terms, tolerance would 
be a nonstarter. We would be stuck in the appallingly long history of repression, 
aggression and coercion characteristic of the year preceding the Reformation, 
that was abated by the progression towards interaction the Reformation hel ped 
141 Jeremy Waldron, "Secularism and the Limits ofCommunity," 57. 
142 Jeremy Waldron, "Secularism and theLimitsof Community," 57. 
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found. 1 don' t mean to imply the days of outrageous conflict are over and gone. 
There will always be conflict in our midst, and so long as there is, toleration, if 
nothing el se (if and when it is the only goal we can achieve, the only response 
that we can muster) will be good enough. It will have suspended, if only 
momentarily, our desire to cloister difference, and to suppress it indefinitely in 
favor of whichever Iife plan or truth we happen to find compelling. It will also 
have given pause to the desire to sacrifice accountability for the sake of security 
or the web of cultural safety. 
There is a final point 1 would like to touch on, in relation to the 
alternative 1 defend. One might see similarities between' the view of toleration 1 
favor an~ the view of public reason 10hnRawis defends in Political Liberalism. 
1 would Iike to clarify that my account does not delineate public reason in much 
the same way since 1 do notseek to alienate the~logically motivated reasons on 
the basis that they are deemed invalid. 1 see no reason for precJuding the 
providential sphere of reasons from public debate: Jeremy Waldron offers an 
interesting analysis of Locke's thought, with the aim of showing how a refusai 
to acknowledge religious reasons is duplicitous since Rawls's system seeks to 
. represent the pluralism society reflects, while alienating a realm of moral 
beliefs which are most of fundamental importance in shaping world views.· 
Moreover, Waldron concludes that we must realize that God is indispensable to 
the justification of arguments of great pith and moment and that we should not 
. . 
refuse to hear out a sphere reasons based on their religious origin. To do so 
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would be to betray the act of engaging in a debate, since most moral arguments 
can be found to inc1ude reasons whose indispensability prevents us from a 
secular reformulation. We should, then;be weary of barring religiously based 
argumentation. 
Wàldron turns to John Locke's critique of Hobbes to explain how 
rèligious reasons are irreducible to a further set of reasons and must be. 
acknowledged as such. Locke believes Hobbes' reliance on fear as the motive· 
for holding promises is insufficient. As Waldron remarks: . 
Leviathan or organized civil society is supposed to be constituted by 
promises and contracts, and those promises, by definition, cannot 
themselves be supported by the power of the state.143 
Hobbes' foundation of social order has difficulty answering why promises and 
contnlcts hold true priar ta Leviathan's existence. Hobbes must explain how we 
came to be where we are if promises are only guaranteed by fear of authority. 
Locke' s own explanation is that the social order is not merely guaranteed by 
. fear of Leviathan, but fear,of God. Therefore, "The taking away of God, tho but 
even in thought, dissolves all"l44 and "one reason for refusing toleration to the 
atheist is that he is in no position to maintain it, or teach it, or interpret it, or 
1 
143 Jeremy Waldron, "Tolerating Atheists?," in God, Locke, and Equality: Christian 
Foundations in Locke's Political Thought. (Cambridgè: Cambridge University Press, -
2002),225. 
144 John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration cited in Jeremy Waldron "Tolerating 
Atheists," 228. 
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apply it, except by disingenuous imitation of those who own up to its real 
basis."145 
The atheist cannot found his belief in equality and moral responsibility 
other than borrowing and "taking advantage of a tradition that he pretended to 
repudiate."I46 Atheists constitute a threat because the integrity of the social and 
political structure depends on the support of ordinary people and what they 
think. If Locke is correct, legal and political institutions which grant equality 
cannot stand upright, in a society where their worth and value is undermined by 
a populace whose moral beliefs do not square nicely with the precepts which 
they endorse. Locke's theory of toleration is troubled, since it must admit that 
individuals can be persecuted on the basis of salvation, unless the intolerance of 
atheists has nothing whatsoever to do with salvation of souls: Maybe, instead, 
) 
the intolerance of atheists is founded upon the notion that only those that 
endorse the foundation of civil society may reap the fruit it bears. In that case, it 
would make sense to believe that laws and institutions should reflect principles 
similar to those that cômpel the morals and ethics of the citizens they address, 
since they ·will otherwise hold no worth for those that must live in accordance 
with them. 
1 don't me an to enter into a detailed exegesis of Locke's theory of 
toleration, but this observation does impact the admissibility of religious 
reasons in the public sphere. Waldron links the implications of Locke's 
justification for the basis of intolerance of atheists to John Rawls' discussion of 
145 Jeremy Waldron "Tolerating Atheists," 228. 
146 Jeremy Waldron "Tolerating Atheists," 227, 
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justification wi~hin his theory of public reason. He seeks to show that Rawls is . 
wrong to oppose Locke's ·view that religious argumentation about equality 
should not only be permitted in public life, but that it is sim ply indispensable .147 
To cite Waldron: 
If you want to get a flavor of what Locke is saying about religious 
skepticism and the consequence of religion's exclusion from public 
reason, you can get a sense of it from the way in which John Rawls 
would be uncomfortable developing a theory of justice in the company 
of various .Nietzscheans or radical Freudians who believed that ail this 
~ . 
moralistic talk of agency and moral personality was redundant and 
reducible nonsense. l48 
Theanalogy between John Locke on God and John Rawls on moral personality 
is aIl the more striking, of course, when we co~sider thatmoral personality has 
to be able to do by itself in Rawls's theory ail the work for equality that is done 
for Locke, by thé notion of our status in the eyes of GOd 149 • Removing Rawls's . 
account of moral personality from his argument has the same effect as 
removing God from Locke's system since, to recall: "the taking away of God, 
tho but even in thought, dissolves all.", As Waldron concludes, "equality cannot 
do its work unless it is accepted among those whom it consecrates as equals."l50 
To repeat, my aim is not to defend the particular thesis, which Locke puts 
forward, nor Waldron's conclusion, but 1 do think this issue impacts which 
147 Jeremy Waldron "Tolerating Atheists?," 237. 
148 Jeremy Waldron "Tolerating Atheists? ," 239. 
149 Jeremy Waldron "Tolerating Atheists?," 239-40. 
ISO Jeremy Waldron, "Tolerating Atheists?," 243. 
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reasons we ought to give credence to, and 1 would conclude, as Waldron does, 
\ '. 
that we must pay heed to religious reasons in light of their indispensability to 
developing a moral stance, in much the same \vay as most secular arguments 
revolve around irreducible presuppositions, whose one difference is that they 
are less likely tobe deemed unreasonable. 1 contend both types of moral 
reasoning hold a valid place in the public realm of reasoning. 
1 hope it is equally clear by now, that 1 do not wish to defend those who, 
in Waldron's words, hold their beliefs so devoutly that even the most sober and 
. ' 
respectful criticism would count as a mortal insult to their personality."151 To 
. , 
recall, religions make "rival claims about the nature and being of God and the 
meaning of human Iife.,,152 This means we are required to tak.e their claims 
seriously and wholeheartedly as views that are not to be dismissed outright in 
certain spheres of existence. Consequently, "persons and peoples must leave 
one another free to address the deep questions of religion and philosophy the 
best way they can, with ail the res,ources they have at their disposal."l53 This 
does not mean the pious will prevail in their attempt to convince us of the 
authority of their beliefs. That remains to be seen. What will count is our 
attitude toward their reasons, sensitivity to their point of origin and the compass 
'. oLmeaning that orients them in the world. It must equally be the, case that we 
should have every right, on this account, ta criticize that which make them 
. . 
151 Jeremy Waldron, "Rushdie and'Religion," in Liberal Rights: Collected Papers 1981-
1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge,University Press, 1993),139. 
152 Jeremy Waldron, "Rushdie and Religion," 138. 
153 Jeremy Waldron, :'Rushdie and Religion," 140. 
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shudder, with ail due respect, or oot. As Waldroo concludes: "there is no other 
.way we can live together and respect each other's grappling with life."l54 
\54 Jeremy Waldron, "Rushdie and Religion," 142. 
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Conclusion 
The emphasis on religion that once dominated theories of toleration has shifted, 
,thus enabling a debate of greater consequence to th~ contemporary moral 
landscape toemerge: A debate on toleration concerned with culture. At this 
point, very little consensus exists about the place which culture ought to be 
granted within apolitical context. 1 hope to have brought sorne c1arity to the 
complexity of the debate. 1 exposed a series of views about culture, which have 
most recently emerged amidst a new wave of theories of toleration and 
multiculturalism as defended by Will Kymlicka, Chandran Kukathas, Michel 
, . 
Seymour, Ingrid Creppell, and Glenn Newey. 1 concluded with an endorsement 
of Waldron 's argument, which is essentially weary of uncritically endorsing 
cultural arguments and of giving groups rights on the basis of group affiliation 
alone. Waldron's assurance brings him to conclude: 
We need cultural meanings, but wedo not need homogenous cultural 
frameworks. We need to understand our choices in the contexts in which 
they make sense, but we do not need any single context to structure ail 
our choices~ [55 
We have reached a time when recalcitrant inward gazing has been met 
with resistance by openness to change, newness, and how it enters the world. 
155 Jeremy Waldron, "Minority Cultures and The Cosmopolitan Alternative," 
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, vol. 25 (1992): 786: 
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We can stand to grow from encountering change and those that urge for it but, 
in order for this growth to occur, difference must be met with a critical spirh 
that constantly reminds of the power we have to further thwart the a:Jready 
crooked timber of humanity. Mélange does not harm or destroy; it merely 
exposes our vulnerability to the tides of the unknown as weil as the notion that 
that which is whole today can come apart tomorrow. As in Romeo and Juliet, 
sorne will even, at times, risk death trying to demolish unsustaihable structures. 
We must realize that what makes culture relevant can be explained, and when it 
does not hold up to scrutiny it can be jettisoned for a better set of beliefs that 
retain worth after judgment. If our betiefs are meaningful, it is that the y are 
persuasive, no matter their pedigree or degree of homogeneity .. 
The Quebec politician Lionel-Adolphe Groulx affirmed, "the children of 
ethnically mixed marri ages suffer from a form of schizophrenia because they 
are inhabited by two different souls". His statement was meant as a warning to 
be taken seriously: those with 'tainted blood' would be plagued by a defect of 
spirit. Those of us, like Waldron, that were born under conditions of cultural 
duress, out of which we nevertheless managed to fashion somethirig new, 
understand that what the future holds - its mixture of heterogeneous dreams 
and its mosaic of cultures - is not to be feared but we1comed because the 
schizophrenia which Lionel-Adolphe Groulx warned of was based on an 
erroneousview of human nature (that we must be pure to be sound) and an 
irrational fear of that which is inevitable: Change. Walzer views group 
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'preservation as essential to aH of us: members of groups and those that prey on 
them' for their parasitic cultural survival. 
Free and fragmented individuals in democratic societies won't provide 
that help themselves, or authorize their governments to provide it, unless 
they recognize the importance ofgroups (their own and ail the others) in 
the formation of individuals like themselves - unless they acknowledge 
that the point of toleration is not, and neverwas, to abolish "us" and 
"them" (and certainly not to abolish "me") but to ensure their continuing 
peaceful coexistence and interaction. The divided selves of 
postmodernity complicate that coexistence, but they also depend upon it 
for their own creation and self-understanding.156 
According to Walzer, the individuals he targets in this statement seek to 
abolish "us", "them" and even "me". But what he fails to understand is that 
those indi viduals never desired to annihilate "us", "them:' or "me", but expand 
aIl three categories to comprise modes of being which they ail three categories 
to comprise modes of bei ng w hich they, heretofore did not incl ude. On 
Waldron's interpretation, as human beings in a bounded physical universe, we 
are destined to confront others that disagree with us. What we must avoid is 
shrinking like violets from the notions and cultures of those that surround us. 
We must, instead, recognize that equating that which is different with that 
which is alien, is not only false but, more to the point, a clear overstatement. 
156 Micheal Walzer, On Toleration (London: Yale University Press, 1997),92. 
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